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This thesis consists of three chapters devoted to the study of the economics of con-
tests. Each chapter can be read independently. A special attention is placed on
teams’ behaviour and team-incentive schemes. These questions are particularly im-
portant as the way in which institutions reward individuals shapes the inequality of
the group to which these individuals belong.
Chapter 1. Optimal Prize Allocations in Group Contests.
We characterize the optimal prize allocation, namely the allocation that maximizes
a group’s effectiveness, in a model of contests. The model has the following features:
(i) it allows for heterogeneity between and within groups; (ii) it classifies contests as
“easy” and “hard” depending on whether the marginal costs are concave or convex.
Thus, we show that in an “easy” contest the optimal prize allocation assigns the entire
prize to one group member, the most skilled one. Conversely, all group members
receive a positive share of the prize when the contest is “hard” and players have
unbounded above marginal productivities. If the contest is “hard” and the marginal
productivities are bounded above, then only the most skilled group members are
certain of receiving a positive share of the prize for any distribution of abilities.
Finally, we study the effects of a change in the distribution of abilities within a
group. Our analysis shows that if the contest is either “easy” or a particular subset
v
of “hard”, then the more the heterogeneity within a group, the higher its probability
of winning the prize.
Chapter 2. Inequalities within Groups: Theory and Evidence.
We study the design of a team in multi-team contests. Is it better to distribute prizes
among players equally, or to just one player? And is it better to spend a budget on
a diverse team with stars and rookies, or on an equal team? First, we study these
questions theoretically. We find that depending on the production function, it is
either optimal to (i) hire superstars and rookies, and reward superstars the most, or
(ii) hire a homogeneous team and reward everyone equally. Then, we test the first
set of predictions in the lab. Unlike the theory, superstars or concentrated rewards
alone do not help a team win. Both must be used together.
Chapter 3. Model of War of Attrition with Outside Options.
We study a model of war of attrition with outside options. In a society that allocates
rewards via tournaments, individuals decide how much resources dedicate towards
winning the prize. Conflicts are of incomplete information and agents’ type consist of
their drawn valuation of the prize and valuation of the outside option. We show that
this model can be reduced to a standard war of attrition with one signal. Further, we




In our society, a colossal amount of resources is allocated via contests. Examples
include politicians competing in electoral campaigns, workers competing for job pro-
motions, athletes for medals, countries for territories and natural resources. In all
these examples, individuals, or group of individuals, expend costly effort and re-
sources in order to win a prize.
In competition between groups, respective members win or lose the prize col-
lectively. However, individuals in a group may have different skills. Therefore, we
develop a theoretical model to investigate how to best split the prize among het-
erogenous members in order to maximise the group’s chance of winning. According
to intuition, higher share of the prize should go to highly members of the groups.
The findings of our model show exactly this. Furthermore, we find that the differ-
ence between the share of the prize of a highly skilled member and the share of a
lower skilled one depends on the players’ cost of effort. If a player’s cost of effort
increases quickly enough, then highly skilled players and lower skilled one split the
prize almost equally.
With the support of a theoretical framework and a laboratory experiment, we
also investigate whether it is better to spend a budget on a diverse team, with highly
skilled members and lower skilled ones, or on an equal team. We discover that,
depending on players’ cost of contributing, it is either optimal to build a diverse
team, and reward highly skilled players the most, or hire a homogeneous team and
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reward everyone equally. We test the first set of predictions in the lab and find that
assigning higher shares of the prize to highly skilled players substantially increases
a group’s performance. As a result, a diverse group has higher chances of winning
than an equal group.
The last topic we study regards contests between individuals. Specifically, we
develop a model to understand how a player’s outside option affects her effort decision
in a contest for a prize. Consider, for example, the investments made by two firms
competing in to discover a new product. The volume of the investments depends on
the profits the firms would make being the first to design the product, but also on the
profits they would make if the patent is won by someone else. Our analysis reveals
that players’ contribution depends both on how much they value the prize and the
outside option. As a result, the winner of the contest is not the player that values
the prize the most, but the player with the highest difference between her value of
the prize and the value of the outside option.
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“Un’idea, finché resta un’idea, è soltanto un’astrazione, se potessi mangiare un’idea
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Optimal Prize Allocations in
Group Contests
1.1 Introduction
“Soldiers generally win battles; generals get credit for them.”1
Contests are ubiquitous in that they arise, for example, in wars, sports, electoral
campaigns and workplace competitions. When contests arise between groups, re-
spective members win or lose the prize collectively. However, individuals in a group
may have different positions, skills, prize valuations, and various impacts over the
outcome of the competition. When the prize has private characteristics, this within
group heterogeneity can lead to personalized incentives, such as highly skilled players
receiving a higher share of the prize over lower skilled ones. Conversely, an egali-
tarian allocation of prizes may be used to encourage cooperative behaviours among
members.
At the beginning of the Republic of Rome, for example, the tribunes equally dis-
tributed the spoils of war among all army members, including those who only guarded
the settlements and protected the wounded. After 407 BC, the Roman Senate intro-
1Napoleon (1769-1821).
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duced different incentives according to the roles performed by the members of the
army: ordinary soldiers received a third of the wage of the knights and half of the
wage of centurions. A similar rule was used under Napoleon’s Empire. Nowadays,
victorious soldiers are awarded medals according to their rank in the army. Like-
wise, candidate prime ministers assign party members to different ministries. The
assignment of the most influential people to the key ministries affects their efforts
during the campaign and eventually the outcome of the elections. Finally, collective
competitions are pervasive in the workplace, where, for example, department stores,
retail chains, sales and production departments set up monetary rewards for the
most productive teams. Nationally representative surveys reveal that 52% of firms
use teamwork in the US, and 47% of British firms organized more than 90% of their
workforce into teams; and 70% of Fortune 1000 companies use some form of team
incentive (Bandiera et al., 2011).
In general, it seems evident that the way in which members are rewarded accord-
ing to their roles and responsibilities affects how much they contribute to the group
goal. Thus, the purpose of this article is twofold: to propose an allocative rule that
maximizes group effectiveness, hereafter the “optimal prize allocation”; and to study
how a change in the distribution of abilities within a group affects its effectiveness.
We study our questions using a model with the following features: it allows for be-
tween and within groups heterogeneity; it classifies contests as “easy” and “hard”
depending on whether the marginal costs are concave or convex; and each group has
a manager that announces the optimal prize allocation only to her members.
Our analysis reveals the following results. In easy contests, the optimal prize
allocations assigns the entire prize to one group member, the most skilled one. On the
other hand, in hard contests in which players’ marginal productivities are unbounded
above, it rewards all group members. If the contest is hard and players’ marginal
6
productivity are bounded above, then only the most skilled members of a group
are certain of receiving a positive share of the prize for any distribution of abilities.
Furthermore, we find that a change in the distribution of abilities within a group
affects the probability of winning of all competing groups. Specifically, if the contest
is either easy or a specific subset of hard, then the more the heterogeneity within a
group, the higher the group probability of winning. Finally, we rank the probability
of winning of the competing groups from highest to lowest under two prize divisions:
the “egalitarian” allocation, i.e. the prize is equally shared among members of the
same group; and the optimal prize allocation. Surprisingly, the ranking resulting
from the egalitarian allocation can be fully reversed by implementing the optimal
prize allocation.
Literature Review
Much progress has been made in the study of contests since the seminal work of
Tullock (1980).2
In regards to group contests for public good, related set-ups are analyzed by
Baik (1993, 2008) and Ryvkin (2011). The former shows that if players have linear
cost, then only the most skilled member in every group contributes to the group
cause. The latter, however, shows that all group members are active participants if
costs are strictly convex. Moreover, Ryvkin (2011) studies how a contest organizer
has to sort (heterogeneous) players in same size groups to maximize the aggregate
effort exerted in the competition. His results are that if the players’ cost function
is moderately (sufficiently) steep, then a more (less) balanced competition increases
aggregate effort. Thus, one could wrongly assume that the same result extends to
the optimal prize allocation because both papers relate to the steepness of the cost
2For a review see Corchón (2007).
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function. However, this is not the case since the two definitions of steepness differ
substantially.3 In addition, we do not focus on maximizing aggregate effort, for
example by allowing groups to compete for different prizes, rather on how a group
manager strategically chooses to split the prize among her members.
In regards to group contests for private good, the literature has considered the
following ways of prize division among the winning group members: the “egalitar-
ian” rule, used among others, by Esteban and Ray (2001) and Cheikbossian (2012) to
study the group size paradox; the “relative effort” rule, which works as an incentive
device, analysed by Nitzan (1991a); and any linear combination between the “egali-
tarian” and the “relative effort” rule studied by Nitzan (1991b) and Nitzan and Ueda
(2011, 2018), meaning part of the prize is divided equally (egalitarian rule) and the
rest proportionally according to each member’s effort (relative effort rule). Since the
use of a relative effort allocation puts members of the same group in competition for
the internal division of the prize, its full implementation eliminates the free-riding
problem. However, its use effectively assumes that relative efforts can be costlessly
observed and rewarded. Alternatively, a model with costs of monitoring needs to
be introduced as in Ueda (2002). Even though this requirement seems innocuous, it
reduces the applicability of this incentive device to few cases.4 Conversely, the egal-
itarian rule does not require that the individual contributions are observable, but it
clearly tempts group members to free-ride on other’s contributions because they win
or lose the prize as a group, i.e. winning the share of the prize is a “collective good”.
To the best of our knowledge, the few works that study allocative schemes and
do not require monitoring, assume symmetry among players and focus on the effects
3For instance, all (convex) power functions are “moderately” steep in Ryvkin’s model. On the
other hand, we define a contest as easy or hard depending on whether the marginal costs are concave
or convex.
4See Bandiera et al. (2011) for an example about fruit picking.
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of within group inequality. Nitzan and Ueda (2014) focus on the effects of intra-
group heterogeneity in prize shares. The authors find that in easy (hard) contests
the greater (lesser) the inequality in prize share, the higher the group efficiency.
Cubel and Sanchez-Pages (2014) demonstrate through Atkinson’s index of inequality
that egalitarian groups have a higher probability of winning the contest when the
efforts of the group members are complementary, or the contest is hard. There are
two main differences between these models and our own: first, while they study
exogenous variations in prize allocations, we analyse the endogenous choices of the
optimal one; second, in our model players can be heterogeneous in their ability. If
players are symmetric, group members choose the same amount of contribution in
equilibrium. On the other hand, if they are heterogeneous, they react to the same
incentive differently. As a matter of fact, in our model different levels of within group
heterogeneity affects both the distribution of the prize among group members and
the probability of winning of all groups.
Section 1.2 contains the preliminaries of the model; Section 1.3 presents our model
of contests with managers and discusses the effect of within group heterogeneity;
Section 1.4 concludes.
1.2 Model preliminaries
We first analyse a model of complete information and exogenous prize allocations
so as to state an equilibrium existence result useful for Section 1.3, where we will
introduce incomplete information and endogenous prize allocations. This approach
is convenient both to introduce the preliminaries of our game with managers and to
compare efforts under the implementation of the egalitarian rule and the optimal one.
Thus, we consider a game with N groups. The i-th group is formed by ni risk-neutral
9
individuals making a total of ∑Ni ni players. Players within-groups are indexed by
ik = (i1, ....ini). All players simultaneously and irreversibly exert an effort xik ≥ 0.
The group effort is the linear sum of its members’ effort, Xi =
∑ni
k=1 xik. The group
probability of winning is defined by the Tullock success function σi = Xi/X, where
X = ∑Ni=1Xi. Exerting effort is costly, but individuals are (possibly) heterogeneous
in their abilities, vik ∈ (0,∞). The cost of effort is given by v−1ik g(xik), and thus
it is costlier for low ability individuals to exert effort.5 We impose the following
assumption on g(x):
Assumption 1 i) g(0) = 0; ii) g′(0) = 0; iii) g′(x) > 0 for all x > 0; iv) g′′(x) > 0
for all x > 0; v) g′′′(x) exists for all x > 0.
Part (i) states that players do not bear costs when they do not exert any effort.
Part (ii) states that the marginal cost of effort at x = 0 is zero. Part (iii) and
(iv) state respectively that the effort cost function is strictly increasing and strictly
convex, which ensures the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium in which all
players exert a positive effort, as long as they receive a strictly positive prize. Finally,
part (v) is necessary for comparative statics. Moreover, since g′ is monotonic and
continuous, it has a well-defined inverse function, f = (g′)−1. Assumption 1 is held
throughout the paper.
In our setting, the winning group is rewarded with a private good prize normalized
to one, and the losing groups receive zero. For the moment, we also assume that
the winning ik member receives a share of the prize φik according to an exogenous
prize allocation φi = (φi1, ..., φini) s.t.
∑ni
k=1 φik = 1. In light of this, the player ik’s
expected payoff is
5This approach to define heterogeneity is commonly used in the literature of contests, see for









Each player ik’s best response to all other players’ choice of effort is given by the
first-order condition associated with the maximization of πik as a function of xik,
subject to xik ≥ 0. Since (1.1) is strictly concave with respect to xik, the first-order
condition is necessary and sufficient for the best response. It follows that the player
ik’s best response is
Xj 6=i
X2
φikvik = g′(xik). (1.2)
As discussed in the introduction, a contest for public good and linear costs, g(xik) =
xik, is considered in Baik (2008). The result is that in each group only the player
with the lowest marginal cost exerts a positive effort.6 On the other hand, under
Assumption 1, it is possible to show that there is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
in which all players that receive a positive share of the prize are active participants
in equilibrium.
Lemma 1.1. Under Assumption 1, the contest between groups has a unique Nash
equilibrium in pure strategies for any prize allocation. In equilibrium, at least one
player in each group exerts a positive effort, therefore all groups exert a positive
effort. The equilibrium effort x∗ik satisfies the system of Equation (1.2) with equality,













6A model with linear costs can be considered as a special case of the easy contests presented in
this paper. As a result of the stark free-riding, it would be optimal to allocate the entire prize to
the player with the lowest marginal cost.
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Finally, we define contests in the following two ways: we refer to a contest as “easy”
when the cost of exerting an additional amount of effort does not rapidly increase;
conversely, a contest is “hard” when an additional amount of effort leads to a signif-
icant increase in the marginal cost.7 Formally,
Definition 1. A contest is “easy” when g′ is strictly concave (f convex). Conversely,
a contest is “hard” when g′ is strictly convex (f concave).
1.3 A model of group contests with managers
Hereafter, we move away from the model with complete information and exogenous
predetermined prize allocations. Instead, we now assume that every group has a
manager that sets a prize allocation φi = (φi1, ..., φini) s.t.
∑ni
k=1 φik = 1 in order
to maximize her group’s probability of winning.8 This is a common situation since
the compensation of managers is usually aligned with the results of their group. In
addition, for a matter of realism, we assume that the prize allocation implemented
by each manager is unobservable by those belonging to other groups. However, all
players’ abilities remain common knowledge.
Information Structure
The timing and the information structure are adapted from Nitzan and Ueda (2011,
2018) and described as follows: i) each manager announces the prize allocation φi =
(φi1, ..., φini) to her members and ii) group members enter in the contest without
knowing the prize allocations implemented in the other groups, and determine their
7The form of the marginal cost, g′, depends on its third derivative. There are contests that are
neither “easy” nor “hard”, for example when g′′′(x) > 0 for some x, and g′′′(x) < 0 for others.
However, we focus our analysis only on these two cases.
8We could relax the equality constraint to
∑ni
k=1 φik ≤ 1, but it would not change our results
since we focus on the case in which managers aim to maximize their group’s effort.
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contributions simultaneously and noncooperatively. Before choosing his contribution,
group member ik only knows his own group prize allocation, and finds himself in the
information set containing the nodes at which the other groups have chosen a prize
allocation φj 6=i = (φj1, ..., φjnj). Thus, member ik’s strategy is described as a function
of φi, and denoted by xik(φi).
Beliefs
We consider the perfect Bayesian equilibrium as a solution of our model assuming
that players can use only pure strategies. Since the choice of the prize allocation φi =
(φi1, ..., φini) is simultaneously made at the beginning of the game by the managers,
then group members’ beliefs are trivial. The belief of player ik, denoted by µik(φi), is
a probability distribution defined over the space of possible allocations implemented
in other groups. Suppose that (φ∗1, ..., φ∗N) is an equilibrium prize allocation. At the
information set lying on the equilibrium path the requirement of consistency implies
that player’s ik belief satisfies µik(φ∗j 6=i|φ∗i ) = 1. Finally, we restrict the beliefs of
group members off the path appealing to the “no-signalling-what-you-don’t-know”
condition.9 Thus, any deviation by a manager does not change the beliefs of her
group members about the allocations implemented in other groups, i.e. µik(φ∗j 6=i|φi) =
1 ∀φi. Altogether, we can use Equation (1.2) to characterize player ik and group i’s
best responses. Since members are aware of the prize allocation φi = (φi1, ..., φini)
implemented by their own manager, i.e. at the information set indexed by φi, then














As previously established, players ik’s expected payoff is strictly concave in xik. It
9Fudenberg and Tirole (1991).
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follows that the first-order conditions given by Equation (1.4) are necessary and
sufficient for the best responses.
1.3.1 Efficient managers
Managers’ behaviours vary accordingly to their objectives. We consider the case
in which they want to maximize their group’s effort through the prize allocation
φi = (φi1..., φini). Before moving forward, it is important to note that the members
of a group hold identical beliefs about the prize allocations implemented in other
groups. Thus, if a manager maximizes her own group effort Xi(φi), then she also
maximizes her group probability of winning since σi = Xi(φi)/(Xi(φi) + X∗j (φ∗j)).
This observation allows us to see that the maximization of the group effort Xi(φi)
and the maximization of the group probability of winning σi are two equivalent
problems. Overall, the manager of group i has to solve
φ∗i ∈ argmax X∗i (φi) s.t.
ni∑
k=1
φik = 1, φik ≥ 0 ∀k, (1.5)
where X∗i (φi) is defined by Equation (1.4). Hence, if we find a profile of prize
allocations (φ∗i , ..., φ∗N) that solves (1.5) for all i, and all players maximize their
expected payoff under their information set, i.e. Equation (1.4) holds with equality
for all i, then we can state that it is a pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium of
the model with managers. As established by the following propositions, the number
of equilibria depends on the type of contest and group members’ ability.
Proposition 1.3.1. Given Assumption 1, the easy contest between groups with man-
agers has ∏Ni nhi perfect Bayesian equilibria in pure strategies, where nhi is the number
of group members with the highest ability in group i. Moreover,
i) every φ∗i rewards the entire prize to one of the nhi group members;
14
ii) all equilibria provide the same X∗i , σ∗i , and X∗ ∀i.
Since an equilibrium is a profile of prize allocations (φ∗i , ..., φ∗N) that solves the systems
of equations (1.4) and (1.5), and φ∗i rewards the entire prize to one among the
most able group members, then all the optimal allocations provide the same X∗i for
all i. However, at different equilibrium allocations different members contribute to
the group effort. On the other hand, a unique equilibrium with one optimal prize
allocation exists if the contest is hard.
Proposition 1.3.2. Given Assumption 1, the hard contest between groups with man-
agers has a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium in pure strategies. Moreover,
i) symmetric players are rewarded equally, vik = vim implies φ∗ik = φ∗im;
ii) if marginal productivity is unbounded, then all members receive a positive share
of the prize, g′′(0) = 0 implies φ∗ik > 0 ∀k;
iii) if marginal productivity is bounded above, then only the highest ability members
receive a positive share of the prize for any equilibrium effort, g′′(0) > 0 implies
φ∗ik > 0 ∀X∗ iff vik = max[v].
In hard contests, a prize allocation is optimal when all the members of a group have






where m 6= k.10 Thus, group
members with the same ability receive the same share of the prize φ∗ik. Furthermore,
if g′′(0) = 0, then all players always receive a positive share of the prize since their
marginal productivity at zero effort equals infinity. Conversely, if g′′(0) > 0, then
the players’ marginal productivity are bounded above. As a result, only the highest














ability members of every group are certain of receiving a positive share of the prize.
For example, we may have that vi1
g′′(X∗i )
≥ vim
g′′(0) , i.e. player i1 receives the entire prize
because we do not allow for negative prizes. We can relate our results to Cornes
and Hartley (2005). In general terms, the authors define a player’s dropout point
as the equilibrium effort X∗ that makes him a non-active participant. If g′(0) = 0,
then there is no dropout point and all players exert positive effort. As a matter
of facts, in our setting, all groups are always active, but member im drops out if
vim < vi1 in easy contests, and if vim/g′′(0) ≤ vi1/g′′(x∗i1) ∀m > 1 in hard ones.
However, group members do not drop out from the competition voluntarily, but
they optimally respond to the allocation implemented by their manager. Part (iii)
of the proposition can be related to the group size effect in contests. Specifically,
the literature shows that, in hard contests in which groups are formed by symmetric
members who equally share the prize, a group increases its effort increasing its size.11
In contrast, in our setting that introduces heterogeneity, an increase in size affects
the group effort if and only if the new member receives a positive share of the
prize from the optimal prize allocation. Finally, the two propositions above relates
to inequality if we interpret the optimal allocation as the efficient (reverse) Pigou-
Dalton transfer of the (possible) rewards.12 Thus, when the contest is easy and/or
players are heterogeneous, then managers have always a preference for inequality.
Specifically, they would commit to transfer part of (or all) the possible gains from
the less able workers to the most able ones even if the contest is hard.
11See the “anti-Olson (2009) theorem” in Nitzan and Ueda (2014) and Proposition 2 in Esteban
and Ray (2001).
12I am grateful to an anonymous referee for bringing this point to my attention.
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Within group heterogeneity and group effectiveness
In this section, we revise some results of the effects of within group heterogeneity
in ability under the widely used egalitarian allocation,13 φik = 1/ni ∀k, and then
compare them to the effects of heterogeneity under the optimal allocation, φi =
φ∗i ∀i. To consider this matter, we define heterogeneity within groups following
the definition of inequality in the sense of Lorenz dominance. Thus, we ask when





are members equilibrium efforts
under a “more spread out” distribution of abilities than xi1, ..., xini . To go along with
this analysis we define the notions associated with majorization introduced by Hardy
et al. (1934) which is equivalent to the notion of inequality in the sense of Lorenz
dominance as shown by Dasgupta et al. (1973).
Definition 2. Let x′ and x be two vectors in Rn, ordered so that x′1 ≥ ... ≥ x′n and






k=1 xk and x′1 + ... + x′l ≥ x1 + ... + xl for all l ≤ n
(with strict inequality for at least one l), then we say that x′ majorizes x written as
x′  x. A permutation symmetric function F of n variables is Schur-convex if the
inequality F (x′) ≥ F (x) holds whenever x′  x. General discussion of majorization
theory and Schur-convex functions can be found in Marshall et al. (1979).
Thus, we try to understand in which situations within group heterogeneity increases
group effectiveness drawing on existing knowledge from non-strategic environments,
but keeping in mind that we actually move towards different equilibria. Let us now
assume that all managers implement the egalitarian allocation, φi = 1/ni ∀i. In this
situation, the group i’s effort in equilibrium is













Fixing σ∗i and X∗, the group i’s effort can be written as a function of the vector of
abilities, X∗i = F (vi). This observation together with Definition 2 helps us to state14
Lemma 1.2. Given a contest between groups in which the prize is equally shared
among group members:
i) if the contest is easy, then the higher the within group heterogeneity in ability,
the higher the group effectiveness. Formally, a change from vi to v′i where
v′i  vi implies σ′i > σi, X ′ > X and X ′i > Xi.
ii) if the contest is hard, then the lower the heterogeneity in ability, the higher the
group effectiveness. Formally, a change from vi to v′i where v′i ≺ vi implies
σ′i > σi, X ′ > X and X ′i > Xi
The intuition of this result is easy to grasp: when the contest is easy, low ability
players free-ride on high ability ones who have a lower cost of contributing. On
the other hand, high ability players are willing to exert substantial amounts of ef-
fort that more than compensate for the free-riding since their cost (for additional
contributions) does not increase rapidly. Hence, keeping the average group ability
constant, the greater the heterogeneity within a group, the higher its effectiveness,
or, equivalently, a more spread out (unequal) distribution of abilities within a group
increases its effectiveness. In hard contests, however, the cost of additional amounts
of effort increases so rapidly that works as a deterrent for all players, but especially
for the highly skilled that recede from exerting substantial contributions. So, when
14Lemma 2 can be derived from Proposition 2 in Nitzan and Ueda (2014) where they allow
heterogeneity in φik fixing vik.
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players are equally rewarded, a lower heterogeneity weakens this effect by making
players exert similar (and less costly at the margin) efforts. Similarly, a less spread
out distribution of abilities implies that members share the costs more equally, thus
paying a lower cost per unit of group effort.
A natural question to ask is whether the above result extends to our framework
with optimal incentives where managers, assigning specific incentives, can enlarge the
range of the possible contributions of their members, which now depends both on
abilities and prize shares. The study of this matter under the implementation of the
optimal allocation φ∗i is straightforward for easy contests because the highest ability
players always receive the entire prize. On the other hand, for hard contests, we have
to carefully analyse players’ and managers’ behaviours. Indeed, any change in ability
distribution leads to a change in the optimal allocation φ∗i , together with changes in
the group effort X∗i and aggregate effort X∗. Thus, to make this analysis tractable
we assume that g′′(0) = 0, which implies that all group members always receive a
positive share of the prize, i.e. φ∗ik > 0 ∀vik > 0.15 Altogether, the equilibrium group












Since the prize allocation is a function of the distribution of abilities within the
group, fixing σ∗i and X∗ allows us to write the group i’s effort as a function of the
vector of abilities, X∗i = F (vi). This observation and Definition 2 help us to state
the next proposition.16
15The widely used power cost function xα/b satisfies this condition.
16Condition on part (ii-iii) is similar to measures of cautiousness, i.e. (g′′′/g′′)/(g′′/g′). Similar
versions of it appears prominently in the contest literature, for example see lemma 3 in Akerlof and
Holden (2012) and Proposition 1 in Ryvkin (2011). However, g(x) is a deterministic cost function,
hence these notions are not directly relevant to the situation under study.
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Proposition 1.3.3. Given a contest between groups with managers:
i) if the contest is easy, then an increase in within group heterogeneity raises the
group effectiveness. Formally, a change from vi to v′i where v′i  vi implies
σ′i ≥ σi, X ′ ≥ X, and X ′i ≥ Xi;
ii) if the contest is hard, g′′(0) = 0 and g′′(x)/g′(x) > 2g′′′(x)/g′′(x), an increase in
within group heterogeneity raises the group effectiveness. Formally, a change in
the distribution of ability from vi to v′i where v′i  vi implies σ′i > σi, X ′ > X,
and X ′i > Xi;
iii) if the contest is hard, g′′(0) = 0 and g′′(x)/g′(x) < 2g′′′(x)/g′′(x), then a de-
crease in within group heterogeneity raises the group effectiveness. Formally, a
change in the distribution of ability from vi to v′i where v′i ≺ vi implies σ′i > σi,
X ′ > X, and X ′i > Xi;
Common to the literature of contests is the assumption that either groups implement
the egalitarian allocation or group members are symmetric in their ability. Thus,
the analysis of within group heterogeneity follows directly from Lemma 1.2. As a
matter of fact, it is widely argued in the literature that in hard contests groups are
more effective the less their within group heterogeneity. Examples include Nitzan
and Ueda (2014), Cubel and Sanchez-Pages (2014), and Esteban and Ray (2001).
However, as shown by part (ii), these results do not hold under the implementation of
the optimal rule. For example, let the cost function be xα, and the related marginal
costs g′(x) = αx(α−1). It is easy to see that a contest is hard for any α > 2,
and g′′(x)/g′(x) > 2g′′′(x)/g′′(x) ∀α ∈ (2, 3), which implies that for 2 < α < 3
within group heterogeneity increases group efficiency under the use of the optimal
allocation. Thus, the deterrent effect that induced highly skilled players to recede
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from exerting substantial contributions can be balanced out by assigning them higher
shares of the prize.17 Indeed, if the initial share is the same, then an increment of
the allocated prize induces more effort from the more able individual. Altogether, a
more spread out distribution of abilities is efficient if the complementarity between
ability and rewards boosts enough skilled players efforts to more than compensate for
the deterrent effect of the increase in costs.18 We conclude our analysis highlighting
other relevant results related to the use of the optimal prize allocation. As shown in
the following propositions, which follow directly from Proposition 1.3.3, we can rank
groups’ probability of winning. Such a ranking is not possible in easy contests with
heterogeneous groups under the implementation of other incentive mechanisms such
as the relative effort rule and the egalitarian rule.
Proposition 1.3.4. Consider a contest with N groups formed by ni individuals such
that v1  ...  vN. If the contest is easy and φi = φ∗i ∀i, then groups’ probability
of winning can be ordered according to the highest ability members in every group.
Formally, vi1 > ... > vN1 implies σ1 > ... > σN ;
Thus, if managers optimally allocate the prize, differences in sizes between groups
are irrelevant to the group efficiency. Indeed, groups can be ranked according to
the most skilled member in every group. In addition to this, for some specific hard
contests, the ranking resulting from the egalitarian allocation can be fully reversed
by implementing the optimal prize allocation.
17If g′′(x)/g′(x) > 2g′′′(x)/g′′(x), then g′(x)/g′′(x) is increasing (see equation (1.23)), which
implies that higher ability players receive higher share of the prize. Interestingly, this is not generally
true.
18The same intuition can be explained looking at the marginal costs of contributing per unit of
group effort via a simple example: a highly skilled player with ability V and a group of n symmetric








V respectively. Finally, it is easy to see that if 1 < α < 3 the single player has lower
costs and then he exerts higher effort in equilibrium.
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Proposition 1.3.5. Consider a hard contest with N groups formed by ni = n in-
dividuals such that v1  ...  vN. Let g′′(0) = 0, and g′′(x)/g′(x) > 2g′′′(x)/g′′(x),
then the use of the egalitarian allocation φi = 1/n implies σ1 < ... < σN , while the
optimal allocation φi = φ∗i implies σ1 > ... > σN .
A full example with power cost functions
Let g(x) = xα, which for α > 1 satisfies Assumption 1. Group i’s best response,
when members are aware of the prize allocation φi = (φi1, ..., φini) implemented by














In order to maximize their group’s effort managers have to solve
φ∗i ∈ argmax X∗i (φi) s.t.
ni∑
k=1
φik = 1, φik ≥ 0 ∀k. (1.9)
From Proposition 1.3.2 we know that φ∗ik > 0 ∀k if α ∈ (2,∞) (hard contest),
while φi1 = 1 if α ∈ (1, 2) (easy contest). Moreover, having assumed a specific cost











Finally, substituting (1.10) into (1.8) and rearranging, gives us the group i efforts in







α−1 if α ∈ (1, 2](1−σ∗i
αX∗
) 1
α−1 (∑nik=1 v 1α−2ik )α−2α−1 if α ∈ (2,∞) (1.11)
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Proposition 1.3.6. Given a contest between groups in which the prize is optimally
allocated among group members:
i) if 1 < α < 3, then the higher the heterogeneity in ability the higher the group
effort.
ii) if α > 3, then the lower the heterogeneity in ability the higher the group effort.
ii) If α→∞, then φik → 1/ni ∀i, k.
The above proposition shows that the category of contests for which heterogeneity
increases group effectiveness is larger under the implementation of the optimal prize
allocation than the egalitarian one. Specifically, it moves from 1 < α < 2, for the
egalitarian allocation, to 1 < α < 3, for the optimal one. Finally, we can establish
from Equation (1.10) that the share of the prize that players receive depends on
parameter α as follows: the higher the α the more equal the prize division among
group members. It follows that, when the contest gets extremely hard, the optimal
allocation tends to the egalitarian rule.
1.4 Conclusions
We have examined a model of group contests for a private good, in which individual
contributions are not observable, to provide a prize allocation that maximizes groups’
effectiveness. Our main findings are the following: in easy contests it is optimal to
allocate the entire prize to one of the most able group members; in hard contests
the optimal allocation depends on players’ ability and their marginal productivity of
effort; we provide sufficient conditions that make, in contrast with other results in
the literature, heterogeneous groups more effective than homogeneous groups even
in contests with strictly convex marginal costs.
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Our model is general in the sense that it can be applied to many types of con-
flicts and work environments which encourage competition through specific incentive
schemes. Moreover, it does not require that managers observe the contributions of
every group member, a requirement that is necessary to implement the relative ef-
fort rule. Thus, we can advise managers on how to assign incentives and build their
teams in different situations. For instance, in competitions with symbolic rewards,
such as “best store of the month”, we can advise managers to form a heterogeneous
group to prevent free-riding problems when the cost function is not too steep. On
the other hand, in retail firms that set up monetary reward contests for sales depart-
ments during periods with a positive shock or a peak in the demand for goods, such
as the run-up to Christmas, we can suggest to the team managers to divide the prize
among all group members to increase the team productivity assuming that the extra
work provided by the workers substantially increases their marginal costs.
In addition, our analysis on within group heterogeneity reveals new insights on
inequality in conflicts. Specifically, it shows that a more spread out distribution of
ability increases group effectiveness for hard contests under the condition that groups
implement the optimal prize allocation.
The simplicity of our framework is attractive but might be criticized because the
group managers do not exert effort and have one goal: to maximize their own team’s
effectiveness. We could have assumed that team managers may contribute to their
group’s effort, but it would not have changed our intuitions based on the contest’s
categorization. Moreover, it is implicit in the model that managers maximize group
efficiency because this gives them some direct or indirect benefits aligned with their
teams’ results; for example, job promotions or other monetary awards.
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Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1.1
The following proof is an extension of Ryvkin (2011) for a perfectly divisible prize.




Note that the left-hand side of Equation (1.12) is the same for any player k of
group i. Without loss of generality, let φi1 > 0. It follows that for any xi1 we
have (vimφim)−1g′(xim) = (vi1φi1)−1g′(xi1). Thus, the effort exerted by all im, where








The group i’s effort Xi can be written as

















Functions αi(xi1) and G′i(xi1) are strictly increasing and satisfies αi(0) = 0 and










conditions Gi(Xi) = 0. Gi(Xi) is strictly increasing, strictly convex and satisfies




The uniqueness of equilibrium follows from Theorem 3 of Cornes and Hartley (2005).
Proof of Proposition 1.3.1
Let g′(x) be strictly concave and f(x) strictly convex (easy contest). A profile of
allocations (φ∗1, ..., φ∗N) is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium if it satisfies Equation (1.4)
and (1.5) ∀i.
In order to prove the proposition we use the following observations:
i) Equation (1.4) holds with equality for any prize allocation, i.e. for any φi =
(φi1, ..., φini) there exists only one Xi (the opposite is not true);
ii) Equation (1.4) is a sum of strictly convex functions for any fixed X = Xi +
X∗j 6=i(φ∗j) > 0.19 Hence, it is strictly convex.
Let us define the group i’s effort that satisfies Equation (1.4) for a prize allocation
φ′i as Xi(φ′i, X∗j (φ∗j)) = X ′i (see observation i). Then, we can find an alternative
allocation, φai , which provides higher effort than φ′i, as follows: we fix the total effort
at X = X ′i +X∗j (φ∗j); and we maximize the group i’s effort given by Equation (1.4).
Clearly, the solution of this maximization problem lies in a corner (see observation
19Assumption 1 guarantees that if φik > 0 for at least a k in every group, then Xi > 0 ∀i.
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ii). There are nhi allocations, where nhi is the number of players with the highest






























It is straightforward that every manager maximizes her group effort iff φi = φ∗i for
any X∗j (φ∗j) > 0, i.e. she allocates the entire prize to one of the most able members.
The uniqueness of equilibrium follows from Lemma 1.1.
Proof of Proposition 1.3.2
Let g′(x) be strictly convex and f(x) strictly concave (hard contest).
In order to prove the proposition we use the observation (i) and (ii) stated for the
proof of Proposition 1.3.1. First, we define the group i’s effort that satisfies Equation
(1.4) for a particular prize allocation φ′i as Xi(φ′i, X∗j (φ∗j)) = X ′i using observation (i).
Second, using observation (ii), we find an alternative allocation, φai , which provides
higher effort than φ′i as follows: we fix the total effort at X = X ′i + X∗j (φ∗j); and
we maximize the group i’s effort given by Equation (1.4). The solution of this






























Overall, we have to find the allocation that maximizes (1.5) at X = Xi(φ∗i )+X∗j (φ∗j),







− λ = 0 ∀k. (1.16)






∀m > 1. (1.17)
Using (1.17), the group i’s effort Xi(φ∗i ) can be written as


















Functions ν(xi1) and G′(xi1) are strictly increasing and satisfy ν(0) = 0, G′(0) = 0.








initial conditions Gi(Xi) = 0. Gi(Xi) is strictly increasing, strictly convex and




The uniqueness of equilibrium follows from Theorem 3 of Cornes and Hartley (2005).
The equilibrium effort X∗i implicitly defines the equilibrium allocation (φ∗1, ..., φ∗Ni)
through the relationX∗i = νi(x∗i1). To better see that this solution gives a unique prize
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allocation for all i consider the following contradiction. Suppose that the equilibrium
effort X∗i can be obtained by two prize allocations, φ1i and φ2i . This would imply that
setting X∗ = X∗i + X∗j (φ∗j), and solving for Equation (1.5) gives the two solutions
φ1i and φ2i . However, due to the strictly concavity of the best response function for
fixed X the solution is interior and unique.
Part i)
Recall that X∗i (φi) > 0. Then, it is straightforward to see that the system of equa-
tions (1.17) holds with equality for all group members with the same ability vik iff
they receive the same prize share φ∗ik. Note that this does not imply that these
members receive a positive share of the prize.
Part ii)
Let g′′(0) = 0, then vik
g′′(0) =∞ ∀k. The optimal prize allocation satisfies the system





∀m > 1. (1.21)




= λ ∀k. (1.22)










Let g′′(0) > 0. The prize allocation of all players can be derived from the relation
σ∗iX























g′′(0) ∀m > 1.
Proof of Lemma 1.2
Given a distribution of ability vi = (vi1, ..., vin), the group i’s total effort given by













Equation (1.24) allows us to see that for each given X and vi there is a unique value
of σi that satisfies Equation (1.6). In other words, Equation (1.6) implicitly defines
σi as a function of vi and X; σi = σi(vi, X). The equilibrium value of X is then
determined by the condition ∑Ni=1 σi = 1. Moreover, σi(vi, X) is strictly decreasing
and continuous in X, limX→∞σi = 0 and limX→0σi = 1. These properties of the
share functions follow directly from Theorem 3 of Cornes and Hartley (2005). Now,
we are ready to prove the Lemma examining the behaviour of σi(vi, X) moving from
vi to v′i when f is strictly convex.




i (vi, X∗) =
1, then:
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i) fix X∗ and σ∗i , the right hand side of (1.24) defined by F (vi) is Schur-convex.
Using Definition 2, a change in ability distribution such that v′i  vi implies F (vi′) >
F (vi). The σi that solves (1.24) for the new distribution of ability, but keeping X∗
fixed, is σ′i(vi′, X∗) > σ∗i (vi, X∗). However, this is not the new equilibrium since
σ′i(vi′, X∗) +
∑N
j 6=i σj(vj, X∗) > 1;
ii) the new equilibrium total effort X∗∗ satisfies σi(vi′, X∗∗) +
∑N
j 6=i σj(vj, X∗∗) = 1.
Hence, X∗∗ > X∗ since σi(vi, X) is continuous and strictly decreasing in X ∀i. This
proves that for every group other than i the winning probability strictly falls, i.e.
σ∗∗j (vj, X∗∗) < σ∗j (vj, X∗) ∀j 6= i and σ∗∗i (vi′, X∗∗) > σ∗i (vi, X∗);
iii) finally, σ∗∗i > σ∗i and X∗∗ > X∗ imply X∗∗i > X∗i .
The same analysis holds if v′i ≺ vi and f is strictly concave.
Proof of Proposition 1.3.3
Part i)
Let vi1 be the highest ability in group i. In easy contests (f is convex) the optimal
allocation φi = φ∗i rewards players as follows: φi1 = 1, φim = 0 ∀m > 1. It follows
from Lemma 1.2 that a change in ability distribution such that v′i  vi and v′i1 >
vi1 → σ∗∗i > σ∗i . On the other hand, a change in ability distribution such that v′i  vi
but v′i1 = vi1 → σ∗∗i = σ∗i .
Part ii-iii)
In order to prove Part ii (iii) of the proposition, it is sufficient to show that at a fixed
X and σi the right-hand side of (1.7) is Schur-Convex (Schur-Concave). The rest of
the proof follows from Lemma 1.2.
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Since g′′(0) = 0 implies vi1
g′′(xi1) =
vim
g′′(xim) (see the proof of Proposition 1.3.2 part ii)

















which holds when g′′(x)/g′(x) > 2g′′′(x)/g′′(x); thereby v′i  vi implies F (v′i) >
F (vi) and σ′i(vi′, X∗) +
∑N
j>1 σj(vj, X∗) > 1. Finally, part (ii-iii) of Lemma 1.2
concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 1.3.6















f ′i1(.)vi1 = f ′im(.)vim.
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We can rewrite the share of the prize for any player im 6= i1 as a share of the prize
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Inequality within Groups: Theory
and Evidence
2.1 Introduction
Work is often carried out in teams that compete for prizes or bonuses. Examples of
these situations include research and development races, litigation, workplace com-
petitions and sports.
As discussed in the literature of contests, the chance of victory depends on how
a team splits the prize among team members. To attain the highest probability
of success, a team should distribute the prize according to the “relative effort” rule:
each team member receives a share of the prize in proportion to his observable effort.
In the context of groups, however, what is usually observable is the aggregate work
of a team, and not the individual contributions to it.
Here, we analyse multi-team contests in which individual contributions are not
observable, and players are possibly heterogeneous in their abilities. We study, both
in theory and in the lab, (i) how to best allocate a prize, and (ii) how to best select
members in order to help a group win.
Our analysis is relevant to organisational settings where a team manager, as well
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as a social planner or a contest organiser, can shape a group’s performance by strate-
gically manipulating the allocation of the rewards and the selection of the members.
In sports, for example, it is well-known that there is a trade-off between building a
team with a “superstar” versus a team with more homogeneous players.1 In either
case, a group’s performance varies with the allocation of the prize. Research de-
partments face a similar situation when competing to attract funding. They choose
whether to invest their budget on a highly skilled researcher or on several junior
researchers. Further, in competitions for bonuses between sales or production de-
partments, managers decide not only on which tasks to assign employees, but also
how much to reward them based on the related responsibilities.
In the model there are two stages. In stage one, all groups strategically imple-
ment a prize allocation to maximise their probability of winning. In stage two, all
players simultaneously exert an effort knowing the prize allocations implemented
by all groups. Individual contributions are often unobservable in contests between
groups, so we propose an approach to allocate the prize that is independent of mem-
bers’ effort: before any effort is exerted, all groups commit to a prize schedule based
on players’ abilities, which are public knowledge. We then study how intra-group
heterogeneity in ability affect a teams’ probability of winning. Since we assume that
both prize and team average ability are fixed parameters, we can naturally interpret
intra-group heterogeneity as intra-group inequality.2
Our analysis reveals that the properties of the cost function themselves determine
the optimal design of a team. And since the shape of the marginal cost plays a key
role, we conveniently classify contests as “easy” or “hard” depending on whether
1See the article by Rory Smith in The New York Times “By His Absence, Zlatan Ibrahimovic
Makes Sweden Stronger at the World Cup” available https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/03/
sports/world-cup/sweden-zlatan-ibrahimovic-.html.
2In Cubel and Sanchez-Pages (2014), the authors show that there is a natural relationship
between the Atkinson index of inequality and a group’s probability of winning.
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the marginal cost is concave or convex respectively. Crucially, a concave (convex)
marginal cost implies an increasing (decreasing) marginal productivity with respect
to the prize. Regarding easy contests, we find that it is optimal to assign the entire
prize to one of the most skilled group members. Regarding hard contests, we find
that: if marginal productivities are unbounded above, then all players receive a
positive share of the prize; if they are bounded, then the team’s superstar may receive
the entire prize; and if and only if teammates have the same skill, then it is optimal
to reward them equally. The intuition behind these findings is easy to grasp: the
first unit of the rewards for winning is always best allocated to the member with the
highest marginal productivity, the team’s superstar. In easy contests, the second, the
third, and last unit of the prize also go to the superstar as his marginal productivity
increases with the prize. In hard contests, on the contrary, the marginal productivity
decreases with respect to the prize. Thus, the second unit of the rewards may go to
the second highest ability player, and so on until the entire prize is allocated.
To understand how intra-group inequality in abilities affects a group’s success,
we must consider whether the group splits the prize equally, as often assumed in
the literature, or as proposed in this paper. In the former case, a more unequal
(spread-out) distribution of abilities increases a group’s chance of winning in easy
contests,3 while in the latter case, it increases a group’s chance of winning in both
easy contests and a subset of hard contests. Intuitively, when the contest is not too
hard, there exists a strong complementarity between ability and rewards. If rewards
are allocated in an assortative way, assigning higher shares to high ability members,
then players’ effort increases enough to make heterogeneous groups superior to more
equal ones.
Despite the fact that many people could argue that a reduction of inequality is
3See Nitzan and Ueda (2014) and Cubel and Sanchez-Pages (2014)
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always desirable, our analysis reveals that institutions are often incentivised to design
unequal groups. In easy contests, regardless of whatever the source of inequality—
abilities, rewards, or both—it increases a team’s performance and under additional
conditions on the cost function, higher levels of within group inequality improve
groups’ performances also in hard contests. Outside our model, however, inequality
can affect group members’ behaviour in various ways. For instance, a high level of
inequality may trigger concerns of intra-group fairness, while a lower level of it may
support cooperative behaviours instead. To understand whether behavioural factors
can overcome our findings on the positive effect of inequality we run a laboratory
experiment.
In the lab, we conduct winner-takes-all contests à la Tullock involving two groups
of two players each. While groups compete for the same prize and consists of on
average equally capable players, they differ in their internal inequality. Specifically,
we design four group types: fully equal, unequal in ability, unequal in prize, and
unequal in both ability and prize. In order to disentangle the effects of the three
inequality types we carry three treatments: 1) Treatment Ability, 2) Treatment Prize,
and 3) Treatment Combination. Each treatment runs a contest between a fully equal
group and a group that is either unequal in ability, in prize, or in both respectively.
Importantly, we carefully choose a cost function such that unequal groups always
have higher probability of winning than the equal ones.
Our empirical analysis reveals that, both in Treatment Ability and Treatment
Prize, the competing groups have very similar chances of winning. In contrast to
the theoretical predictions, we do not find empirical support that an unequal team
in ability, or in rewards, performs better than a fully equal team. In Treatment
Combination, on the other hand, the unequal group not only has considerably higher
probability of winning than the equal one, but its contribution is also the highest
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among all groups and across all treatments. Thus, matching high rewards to high
ability players has two effects on a group’s performance: it induces a higher team
effort than the equal split; and it makes the unequal group superior to the equal one,
both of which are in accordance with our predictions.
Another important feature of the experiment is the analysis of players’ contribu-
tions using data on their beliefs. Contrary to their beliefs about teammates’, those
about the opponents’ strategies are an important predictor of a player’s contribu-
tions. Specifically, subjects choose higher efforts when they believe the competing
group does the same. Further, contributions are higher than what theory predicts,
although the Nash predictions were corrected using players’ beliefs. Precisely, we
call belief adjusted deviation (BAD) the difference between a subject’s choice and
the model’s prediction adjusted to his beliefs about others. The BAD in our exper-
iment is much larger than zero, which means subjects overbid. Finally, the BAD is
correlated with subjects’ risk attitudes, and it declines with experience, suggesting
that the overbidding is due to both player’s risk preference and errors.
Literature review
Much progress has been made in the study of contests since the seminal work of
Tullock (1980). Regarding team contests, the literature has considered contests with
different sharing rules (Nitzan, 1991a,b), group sizes (Esteban and Ray, 2001; Nitzan
and Ueda, 2011), heterogeneous players (Baik, 2008; Nitzan and Ueda, 2018; Choi
et al., 2016) and timings of the choices (Balart et al., 2018). These papers employ one
of the following prize allocations among winning group members: the egalitarian rule,
the relative effort rule, or any linear combination of the two; of which the relative
effort rule better incentivises groups.4 Indeed, its use eliminates the free-riding issue
4See Flamand et al. (2015) for a survey.
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by putting teammates in competition for the appropriation of the prize. However, it
is contingent on ex-post individual efforts, which are not always observable.
Nitzan and Ueda (2014) and Cubel and Sanchez-Pages (2014) are the few models
studying prize allocations that are independent of players’ effort provisions. Although
assuming symmetry among players, they find that the equal split maximises a team’s
performance only if a player’s marginal costs of effort increases rapidly enough, while
unequal division are otherwise more efficient. In an incomplete information contest
for a pure private prize, Trevisan (2020) shows that when players are heterogeneous,
then unequal allocations can improve a team’s effort even though marginal costs
increase very quickly. In this paper, by contrast, we study complete information
contests, where the prize is a mix of a public and a private good (Esteban and Ray,
2001). Further, we conduct a lab analysis related to implications of intra-group
inequality.
The literature on contests has also dedicated much attention to empirically test
models’ predictions, especially those regarding sharing rules (Gunnthorsdottir and
Rapoport, 2006; Amaldoss et al., 2000; Kugler et al., 2010), team sizes (Abbink et al.,
2010; Ahn et al., 2011), endowments (Heap et al., 2015), alliance formations (Herbst
et al., 2015), and power differentials (Bhattacharya, 2016). Most of the experiments
design groups with symmetric group members. Exceptions are in Sheremeta (2011),
where groups have a stronger member, and in Brookins et al. (2015a), where all
players differ in their cost of contributing. However, these papers do not relate to
our set-up since they test predictions on the use of different success functions and
different sorting of players, rather than investigating inequality issues. Both in the-
ory and in the lab, non-incentivised types of heterogeneity are studied in Konrad and
Morath (2019). The authors model a dynamic contest in which contestants possibly
differ only in behavioural motives that go beyond the payoff maximisation. Learning
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about others’ motives and self-selection have possible implications on players’ effort
escalation. The corresponding experimental set-up provides evidence for such het-
erogeneous motives, for self-selection and for effort escalations. Similar to our study,
they also find a persistent and positive correlation between subjects’ effort and their
beliefs about opponents’ efforts.
The experimental paper most similar to ours is Fallucchi et al. (2019), which
carries contests involving two groups of three players each. Groups can be of two
types: fully equal, or unequal in ability. Depending on the treatment, they compete
either against another group of their same type, or against a different one. The
authors’ main finding is that the highest total effort is obtained in a competition
between two unequal groups. The authors also run a treatment involving a fully
equal group and a group unequal in ability, which is comparable to our Treatment
Ability. Here, they don’t find substantial differences between the two groups’ chances
of winning, a result in accordance to ours. Despite this similarity, the two papers’
experimental designs differ substantially. We randomly rematch players every round
whilst they employ a partner-matching protocol.5 We use a convex cost function
instead of a linear one. And we further analyse the effects on team effectiveness
of three types of internal inequality, rather than studying groups’ behaviour under
different matching of groups. But more importantly, to the best of our knowledge we
are the first paper to provide a theory and empirical evidence of the positive effect
of inequality on group effectiveness.
Section 2.2 presents our model of contests; Section 2.3 presents the experimental
findings; Section 2.4 concludes.
5In other words, we try to avoid any cooperative behaviour that may occur in a partner-matching
protocol given the repeated interaction between players.
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2.2 The Model
In this section, we develop our model where groups compete to obtain a prize. The
model is dynamic with two stages: a prize allocation stage, and a contest stage. In the
former, all groups simultaneously choose a prize allocation to maximise their chances
of winning. The allocation is independent of individual’s efforts. In the latter, all
players simultaneously exert an effort knowing the prize allocations implemented by
all groups. The solution concept is the Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies.
2.2.1 The preliminaries
We consider N groups. The i-th group is composed of ni risk-neutral members
who are indexed by ik = (i1, ..., ini). The prize is a mixture of a public good
part, P ≥ 0, and a private one, Φ > 0. The private part is shared among group
i’s members according to the allocation φi = (φi1, ..., φini) s.t.
∑ni
k=1 φik = Φi and
φik ≥ 0 ∀k. If group i wins the contests, then each of its members receives a
reward of P + φik. All players ik exert an effort xik ≥ 0 at a cost v−1ik g(xik), where
vik ∈ (0,∞) is the (possible) heterogeneous ability parameter.6 Group i’s total effort
is Xi =
∑ni
k=1 xik, and group i’s probability of winning is given by the Tullock success
function σi = Xi/X, where X =
∑N
i Xi. Overall, for an arbitrary prize allocation








The case of linear costs, g(x) = x, is studied in Baik (2008). The author shows
6This approach to define heterogeneity is commonly used in the literature of contests, see for
example Ryvkin (2011, 2013), Brookins et al. (2015b), Nitzan and Ueda (2018) and Trevisan (2020).
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that only one member in each group exerts a positive effort, the superstar. In our
sequential game, linear costs would make the analysis trivial: as a result of the stark
intra-group free-riding, the allocation that maximises a group’s chances of winning
assigns the entire prize to the team’s superstar. To avoid this situation, we assume
that the cost function g(x) is strictly convex. Under the following additional condi-
tions, this guarantees that all players receiving a prize exert a positive effort.
Assumption 1 i) g(0) = 0; ii) g′(0) = 0; iii) g′(x) > 0 for all x > 0; iv) g′′(x) > 0
for all x > 0; v) g′′′(x) exists for all x > 0. Since g is monotonic and continuous, it
has a well-defined inverse function, f = (g′)−1.
Under Assumption 1, the first-order condition of πik, subject to xik ≥ 0 is necessary
and sufficient for player ik’s best response:
X −Xi
X2
(Pi + φik)vik = g′(xik). (2.2)
The contest stage has a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium in which all groups
always exert a strictly positive effort.
Lemma 2.1. Given Assumption 1, the contest between groups has a unique equilib-















(X∗)2 (Pi + φik)vik
)
. (2.3)











Equation (2.4) implicitly defines a group i’s probability of winning as a function of
the aggregate effort X, σi = si(X). The equilibrium value of X is determined by the
condition ∑Ni=1 si(X) = 1. Note that the left-hand side of (2.4) exceeds the right at
σi = 1. Furthermore, the right-hand side is decreasing on σi, which implies that there
is a unique σi that solves (2.4) for any X > 0. Finally, because σi = si(X) is strictly
decreasing and continuous in X for all i, limX→∞si(X) = 0 and limX→0si(X) = 1,7
then it should be clear by the intermediate value theorem that there is only one
equilibrium aggregate effort 0 < X∗ < ∞ such that ∑Ni=1 si(X∗) = 1. Finally, the
equilibrium aggregate X∗ and probability of winning σ∗i define the groups’ efforts as
X∗i = σ∗iX∗ ∀i.
Hereafter, as in Trevisan (2020), we conveniently refer to two types of contests:
“easy” and “hard”.
Definition 1. A contest is “easy” when f is strictly convex (g′ concave). Conversely,
a contest is “hard” when f is strictly concave (g′ convex).
2.2.2 The prize allocation
As discussed in the introduction, a prize allocation that rewards players according
to their relative effort eliminates the free-riding problem. However, it requires ob-
servation of individual contributions. As what is usually observable is the final work
of a team, and not the individual contributions to it, we consider prize allocations
that are not contingent on players’ ex-post efforts. Formally, all groups i = 1, ..., N
7Function si(X) is known as the “share function” and its properties follow directly from Cornes
and Hartley (2005).
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simultaneously choose a prize allocation φi = (φi1..., φini) in order to maximise their
probability of winning σi = Xi/X.8 Thus, the group i’s objective function is given
by




φik = Φi, φik ≥ 0 ∀k.
(2.5)
If we find a profile of prize allocations (φ∗i , ..., φ∗N) that solves (2.5) for all i and
all players maximise their expected payoff, then we can state that it is a Subgame
Perfect Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies. As established by next proposition, the
number of equilibrium prize allocations depends on whether the contest is easy or
hard, and on group members’ ability.9
Proposition 2.2.1. Suppose that the contest is easy, then the model has ∏∞i=1 nhi
Subgame Perfect Equilibria, where nhi is the number of group members with the highest
ability in group i. Suppose that the contest is hard, then the model has a unique
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium. In equilibrium, the properties of group i’s allocation
φ∗i = (φ∗i1, ..., φ∗ini) can be summarised as follows:
i) in easy contests, φ∗i rewards the entire prize to one of the nhi members;
ii) in hard contests, φ∗i rewards members with the same ability equally, vik = vim
implies φ∗ik = φ∗im;
8This is a common situation assuming that the prize division is imposed by a third subject,
whose compensation is aligned with the results of the group. Examples include organisations that
use contests to boost workers productivity and retail firms that set-up monetary reward contests
for sales departments during periods with a peak in the demand for goods. Furthermore, in sports
competitions managers face the task of dividing the prize among the winning members.
9In Appendix A, we show that an allocation that maximises a group’s probability of winning
also maximises the group effort. In other words, under the equilibrium profile of prize allocations
(φ∗i , ..., φ∗N ) no group has an incentive to deviate by implementing a different allocation rule neither
to increase its probability of winning nor to increase its effort.
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iii) in hard contests where Pi > 0 and/or g′′(0) > 0, φ∗i rewards the highest ability
members for any equilibrium efforts X∗, φ∗ik > 0 ∀X∗ iff vik = max[v].
The interpretation of the above proposition is easy to grasp if we interpret the vector
of players’ effort decisions, Equation (2.3), as a vector of effort production functions.
When the contest is easy (f is convex), then players’ marginal productivity of effort
increases in the prize share φik. So, the group probability of winning is maximised
allocating the entire prize to the most skilled player. On the other hand, when
the contest is hard (f is concave), then the players’ marginal productivity of effort
decreases in the prize share φik possibly leading to a more equal distribution of the
prize. However, it may still be the case that a high ability player is more productive
(at the margin) than his teammates even if he receives the entire prize.
Despite the results of the proposition resemble those of standard constrained
optimisation, it is important to keep in mind that the prize allocations are chosen
strategically by all groups. Furthermore, the use of such allocation does not merely
maximise a group effectiveness for a given distribution of ability, but it also has
implications on the optimal team composition as discussed in the following section.
2.2.3 The effects of intra-group inequality
Before moving to the experimental analysis, we revise recent results on the effects
of intra-group inequality in contests. This approach is convenient to highlight how
such findings relate to the allocative scheme proposed in the previous section and to
introduce the hypothesis we test experimentally.
For simplicity, suppose there are two groups, A and B, formed by two players each.
Groups are on average equally skilled, but abilities in group B are distributed more
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unequally (in the sense of Lorenz’s distribution) than in group A.10 For example,
group B has one member more skilled than the other while group A’s players are
symmetric.
In this situation, under which conditions is group B more effective than A? The
answer to that question can be found in Nitzan and Ueda (2014) and Cubel and
Sanchez-Pages (2014). The authors show that the greater the inequality across one
dimensional group characteristics, the higher (lower) a group’s efficiency if the contest
is easy (hard). In our example, if members in group A and group B split the prize
equally, but group B is more unequal than A on the ability dimension, then B has
higher (lower) chances of winning in easy (hard) contests. This result can be extended
to the case in which members of the two groups are symmetric in ability, but group
B is more unequal than A on the reward dimension.11
Suppose now that group B changes its allocation from the egalitarian rule to
a more efficient one. How does this affect its effectiveness? Clearly, group B’s
effectiveness must increase independently on the type of contest. Furthermore, as
shown in Trevisan (2020), if groups implement the optimal allocation, then groups
unequal in ability are stronger than more equal ones.12
Overall, the analysis on contests reveals that organisations are often incentivised
to design unequal groups. In easy contests, regardless of the source of inequality—
abilities, rewards, or both—it increases a team’s performance. Under additional
10Note that, in our setting, a higher within group heterogeneity (mean-preserving spread) can be
viewed as a higher within group inequality (in the sense of Lorenz dominance). Similarly, a more
unequal distribution of the reward can be interpreted as a (reverse) Pigou-Dalton transfer, i.e. a
commitment to transfer the gain from one member to another conditional on winning the contest.
This relation between heterogeneity and inequality allow us to straightforwardly link our results to
the inequality and welfare literature.
11A model with multiplicative heterogeneity is mathematically equivalent to a model with het-
erogeneity in rewards.
12For a pure private prize, Proposition 3.3 in Trevisan (2020) extends to our setting with complete
information.
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conditions on the cost function, the same occurs in hard contests. Outside our model,
however, a high level inequality can trigger concerns of fairness, while a lower level of
it may support cooperative behaviours instead. To understand whether behavioural
factors can overcome the theoretical findings on the positive effect of inequality we
run a laboratory experiment. In the experiment (see below) we create a competition
between groups, very similar to the example provided above, to empirically test the
following theoretical predictions about easy contests: the greater the within group
inequality in ability, rewards, or their efficient combination, the higher the group
effort and chances of winning.
2.3 The experiment
We consider a contest between two groups, A and B, of two players each. The
winning group receives a total prize of Φ = 1000 while the losing group receives
nothing. The winning members share the prize either equally, a 50-50 split, or
unequally, a 75-25 split. The players’ cost function is g(x)/vik = 10x1.2/vik, i.e. the
contest is “easy”. There are three types of players: L, M, H - with ability parameter
vL = 1, vM = 2, vH = 3 representing low, medium and high ability respectively.13
Across all three treatments, group A is the equal group as it consists of two M players
that equally share the prize. On the contrary, group B is the unequal group.
We implement a total of three between-subjects treatments. In Treatment Abil-
ity, which studies the inequality in ability, group A=(M, M; 50, 50) competes against
B=(H, L; 50, 50). In Treatment Prize, which studies the inequality in reward, group
A=(M, M; 50, 50) competes against B=(M, M; 75, 25). As seen from Table 2.1, play-
ers’ equilibrium effort levels are identical among the two treatments as we created
13To avoid framing, we used X, Y, Z in the experiments.
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an equivalent level of inequality. In Treatment Combination, which studies the effi-
cient combination of the two types of inequality, group A=(M, M; 50, 50) competes
against B=(H, L; 75, 25). As seen from Table 2.1, assigning higher rewards to the
H player predicts the highest group effort and the probability of winning among all
treatments. Thus, the following hypotheses are formulated based on the predictions
in table 2.1.
Hypothesis 1.
a) In Treatment Ability, group B contributes more than group A;
b) In Treatment Prize, group B contributes more than group A;
c) In Treatment Combination, group B contributes more than group A;
Hypothesis 2.
In Treatment Combination, group B shows the highest contributions and proba-
bility of winning among all groups and treatments.
Treatment Ability Treatment Prize Treatment Combination
group A group B group A group B group A group B
Type M L H M L H M L H
Individual Costs 52 0 100 52 0 150 50 0 144
Individual Payoff 470 578 478 470 439 567 430 459 633
Group Payoff 940 1056 940 1006 860 1092
Individual Effort 7 0.1 17 7 0.1 17 6.6 0 23.1
Group Effort 14 17.1 14 17.1 13.2 23.1
P. of Winning 44.4 55.6 44.4 55.6 36.4 63.6
Table 2.1: Theoretical predictions
Note: Individual payoff and group payoff include the 300 endowment points for each subject.
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2.3.1 Design and procedure
The experiment was conducted at the BLUE lab at the University of Edinburgh and
programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). We ran a total of 16 sessions with 12
or 16 subjects per session. In total, we recruited 168 subjects from university sub-
ject pool. Subjects were allowed to participate in only one session. They earned an
average of $12.9, including a show-up fee of $3, for a session lasting approximately
75 minutes. After finishing the main part of the experiment, we conducted an in-
centivised 12-question IQ test. Then, we elicited the subjects’ risk preferences with
real incentives using the Holt and Laury (2002)’s method. Finally, we surveyed sub-
jects with personality questions and basic information such as gender and age. The
printed instructions were distributed and read aloud by an experimenter to assist
understanding. The instructions can be found in Appendix B.
The contest part of the experiment lasted a total of 30 rounds. At the beginning
of the experiment, subjects were randomly assigned as type L, M , H and learned the
allocation rule. Subjects were informed that their role and the prize division stayed
the same during the entire experiment. To eliminate the repeated game effect, we
implemented a random matching mechanism. In each new round, subjects were
randomly matched with another subject to form a new group, and to compete with
another group formed in the same way.
The groups competed for a prize worth 1,000 points in a Tullock way. In each
round, all subjects received an endowment of 300 points, which they could either
use to invest in the group account contributing an effort xi ∈ [0, 50],14 or save for
personal payoff. In order to reduce the ceiling effect of the endowment, subjects
14Equivalently, in the instruction we used the terminology “lottery tickets” instead of “effort” as
in Chowdhury et al. (2019).
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were allowed to invest beyond their endowment.15 Notably, the endowment and
contribution limit were carefully selected to construct a fair competition. Specifically,
for all treatments, subjects could learn that their group has an approximately 50%
chance of winning if all players, regardless of their types and allocation rules, invested
either the minimum or maximum of the contribution limit, or they used all their
endowments as contributions.
To investigate the role of beliefs, we incentivised subjects to submit their predic-
tions about their own group’s and the opponent group’s contribution (while making
their own contribution decisions). In every round, subjects received a reward of 50
points for each correct prediction. In order to reduce the curiosity effect, at the
end of each round, we provided each player with feedback that includes the total
contributions of both groups, the probability of winning of both groups, the winning
group and the payoff (see Appendix B). At the very end of the experiment, subjects
received real payment from 5 randomly selected rounds (Brookins et al., 2015a).
2.3.2 Group level results
In this section, we describe the group and contest level findings. Table 2.2 reports
the summary statistics of the efforts and winning probabilities in comparison to the
theoretically predicted values. It shows that, on average, unequal groups contribute
as much as the equal ones in Treatment Ability and Prize. On the other hand, they
outperform the equal group in the Treatment Combination.
On average, group contributions goes against Hypotheses 1a, and 1b, i.e. the
existence of competitive advantage of within-group inequality in either abilities or
15Subjects were informed that at the end of the experiment they received at least the show-up
fee. However, they were warned that they could receive a negative payoff for the contest part, which
reduces the strictly positive payoffs in the following parts of the experiment.
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rewards, as efforts in Treatment Ability and 2 are similar across groups. On the
other hand, there is evidence in support of Hypothesis 1c, i.e. the positive effect
of an effective combination of the two inequalities, as group effort is 30% higher for
group B in Treatment Combination.
Treatment Ability Treatment Prize Treatment Combination
group A group B group A group B group A group B
Type M L H M L H M L H
Individual Costs 176 (52) 160 (0) 175 (100) 148 (52) 91 (0) 249 (150) 143 (50) 115 (0) 244 (144)
Individual Payoff 382 (470) 382 (578) 367 (478) 397 (470) 336 (439) 434 (567) 368 (430) 329 (459) 488 (633)
Group Payoff 764 (940) 749 (1056) 794 (940) 770 (1006) 736 (860) 817 (1092)
Individual Effort 18.6 (7) 9.3 (0.1) 26.2 (17) 16.2 (7) 10.3 (0.1) 25 (17) 15.6 (6.6) 7.1 (0) 35.1 (23.1)
Group Effort 37.2 (14) 35.5 (17.1) 32.4 (14) 35.3 (17.1) 31.2 (13.2) 42.2 (23.1)
P. of Winning 51.5 (44.4) 48.5 (55.6) 48.9 (44.4) 51.1 (55.6) 42.4 (36.4) 57.6 (63.6)
Table 2.2: Comparison statistics with experimental results and predicted values
Note: Theoretical predictions are in parentheses. Individual payoff and group payoff include the
300 endowment points for each subject.
In Table 2.3, we show the results of the multilevel linear mixed-effects regressions.
The regressions investigate how the total contribution of the unequal groups differ
from the equal groups across treatments, taking into account the inter-dependency of
observations in the same experimental sessions and the same individuals. Specifically,
although not statistically significant, the unequal groups show a lower contribution
than the equal groups in Treatment Ability, a result following Fallucchi et al. (2019).
Similarly, the unequal groups have a slightly and insignificantly higher contribution
than equal groups in Treatment Prize. On the other hand, the unequal groups
demonstrate a significantly higher total contribution in Treatment Combination.16
Result 2.1. Compared with equal groups, unequal groups either in the ability or
reward do not demonstrate higher contributions. Conversely, unequal groups with an
16We also conducted a series of Kruskal-Wallis test on groups B’s (the unequal groups) contri-
butions by including all treatments, Treatment Combination and Treatment Combination. The
results are all statistically significant (p < 0.01) meaning that the group B contribution is highest
in Treatment Combination.
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efficient combination of the two types of inequality outperform. The unequal groups
in Treatment Combination show the highest level of contribution.
Although the unequal groups in Treatment Combination have a probability of win-
ning lower than what theory predicts, we argue that our experimental observation
is a conservative estimation of the effect of inequality. First, as shown in Figure 2.1,
28.6% of the decisions of H types in Treatment Combination equal the upper limit of
their contribution. Second, our experimental setup is likely to promote overbidding,
which levels out theoretical differences between groups’ probability of winning since
we adopted the probabilistic rule of reward allocation rather than the proportional
rule. A probabilistic allocation makes contributions a riskier investment, thus pro-
moting overbidding due to uncertainty, for example, see Chowdhury et al. (2014)
and Masiliūnas (2019).
Dependent variable: group contribution
Treatment Ability Treatment Prize Treatment Combination
Heterogeneous group -1.508 3.674 11.71***
(2.558) (1.92) (2.294)
Period -0.327*** -0.0528 -0.248***
(0.0564) (0.0498) (0.053)
Constant 44.17*** 29.10*** 22.92***
(5.02) (3.485) (3.72)
Observations 780 900 840
Table 2.3: group contribution difference between equal and unequal groups
Note: Multilevel linear mixed-effects models using random intercepts for experimental sessions and
individual subjects. Heterogeneous group is a dummy variable with the equal group being 0 and
the unequal group being 1. Numbers in parentheses indicate standard errors. Significance levels *




As presented in Table 2.2, it is evident that there is a substantial overbidding com-
pared to the Nash prediction. The overbidding is ubiquitous and similar across treat-
ments and types. The average overbidding for Treatment Ability, Treatment Prize
and Treatment Combination is 10, 9.1 and 9.4 respectively. The average overbidding
for type L, type M and type H is 8.8, 9.9 and 9.7 respectively.17
Result 2.2.
a) There is a substantial overbidding by all types in all treatments compared to
the Nash Equilibrium predictions.
b) On average, the magnitude of overbidding is similar across all treatments and
types.
Distribution of effort
In Figure 2.1, we present the distribution of players’ efforts, which are clearly dis-
persed, or overspread (Chowdhury et al., 2014), for all types in all treatments. How-
ever, there seems to be a first-order stochastic dominance in effort choices between
types in all treatments. That is, consistent with the theory and in terms of dis-
tribution, H type subjects exert higher effort than M type subjects, and M type
subjects exert higher effort than L type subjects. The figure also shows that zero
contributions for L type subjects, though predicted by the model, are not commonly
17Overbidding in contest experiments has been found and addressed by many existing studies
(Brookins et al., 2015a; Abbink et al., 2010; Ahn et al., 2011; Fallucchi et al., 2019)
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observed.18 Overall, we can state that subjects were responsive to the types they
were assigned.19
Result 2.3. The contribution decisions of the subjects are responsive to their types,
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Figure 2.1: Effort dispersion by treatment
Beliefs
Table 2.4 presents a multi-level mixed effect Tobit regression controlling for sessions
and individuals.20 It allows us to account for the potential dependence of the con-
tribution decisions within each session and by each individual. In all models, we
18In addition, the proportion of zero contributions is similar across treatments, while the propor-
tion of maximum contribution choices are more frequent in Treatment Combination.
19See also Table 2.4.
20We use a Tobit model because we observe a large fraction of the decisions made by type H
players equal to the upper limit of the contribution, 50. For example, in Treatment Combination,
28.6% of the contribution choices made by type H players are 50.
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include the variables L type and H type to capture the effects of different costs and
prize share, the variable period to capture the potential trend over time and the
variable L contribution to control for path dependency. It is evident that players
respond to their type since L type’s parameter is negative, H type’s parameter is
positive, and both are significant in all models. The period’s parameter is negative
and significant in all models across Treatment Ability and Treatment Combination,
which suggests that subjects can potentially learn to reduce overbidding over time.21
In Model 2, we include the predictions submitted by subjects to investigate how
strategic considerations affect contribution decisions. The results indicate that sub-
jects are strongly and positively responsive to the total contributions of their oppo-
nents, as individuals choose to contribute more if they believe their opponent group
has a greater total contribution. On the other hand, we don’t find any significant
relationship between individual contribution and the predicted contribution of their
peer. In other words, we do not find evidence of punishing free-riding or rewarding
cooperative behaviours within a group, but competitive pattern between groups.
Result 2.4. Subjects’ contributions are positively affected by the expectation of their
opponent group’s contribution levels, but not correlated with the belief on their peer
group member’s contribution.
Finally, model 3 controls for personal characteristics including the variables Female,
IQ score and Risk-seeking. In our experiment, we don’t find any gender difference in
terms of contribution decisions.22 IQ tests do not have significant predicting power,
while the risk-seeking parameter, which is measured by the Holt and Laury (2002)’s
lottery method, seem to be positively correlated with contribution, a result confirmed
21Declining contributions are consistent with many prior experiments (Brookins et al., 2015a;
Cason et al., 2012, 2017; Fallucchi et al., 2019) Notably however, significant overbidding still presents
at the end of 30 rounds.
22Previous studies provide mixed evidence (Heap et al., 2015; Baik et al., 2019).
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Dependent Variable: individual contributions
Treatment Ability Treatment Prize Treatment Combination
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
L.contribution 0.387*** 0.360*** 0.360*** 0.281*** 0.271*** 0.271*** 0.352*** 0.335*** 0.374***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.026) -(0.025) (0.028)
Period -0.116*** -0.0880*** -0.0881*** -0.020 -0.026 -0.026 -0.0816*** -0.0699** -0.0759**
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.024)
L-Type -5.901** -5.964** -6.123*** -4.061* -3.884* -3.984* -5.527** -5.889** -6.627**
(1.925) (1.855) (1.796) (1.922) (1.936) (2.006) (1.991) (2.107) (2.166)
H Type 5.029** 4.899** 5.740** 7.190*** 7.299*** 7.091*** 14.91*** 16.41*** 15.04***
(1.920) (1.862) (1.885) (1.929) (1.936) (1.912) (2.050) (2.102) (2.064)
Guess peer -0.010 -0.010 -0.024 -0.024 0.047 0.039
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.026)
Guess other 0.134*** 0.133*** 0.105*** 0.105*** 0.0906*** 0.0758***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018)
Female -0.151 -0.578 -0.764
(1.525) (1.586) (1.647)
Risk-seeking 0.806* 0.760 1.061*
(0.398) (0.555) (0.478)
IQ score 0.511 -0.044 0.081
(0.468) (0.565) (0.516)
Constant 13.22*** 8.402*** -0.118 11.88*** 8.863*** 6.139 11.27*** 6.749*** 1.462
(1.277) (1.389) (4.994) (1.217) (1.371) (6.348) (1.274) (1.489) (5.995)
Observations 1560 1560 1560 1800 1800 1800 1680 1680 1320a
Table 2.4: Individual contribution multi-level Tobit regression
Note: Multilevel Tobit models using random intercepts for experimental sessions and individual
subjects. The upper limit of the Tobit model is 50. L.contribution is the individual contribution of
the previous round. L-Type and H-type are categorical variables standing for the low ability/reward
subjects and high ability/reward subjects respectively. The omitted category is the medium type.
Guess other stands for the expectation about the opponent group’s total contribution. Guess peer
stands for the expectation about the other group members’ individual contribution. Female is
a dummy variable with female subjects being 1. Risk seeking ranges from 1 to 10 with higher
values indicating more risk-seeking attitudes. IQ score is the total No. of correct answers from
12 questions. Numbers in parentheses indicate standard errors. Significance levels * p < 0.1, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
aDue to a technical problem, we lost the information on the very last stage of the experiment
including gender and age for one session (12 subjects). The rest of the session, including final
payments, was not affected.
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Figure 2.2: The gap between prediction and actual outcome
Note: Guess peer difference is calculated by the prediction elicited minus the actual contributions
by the subject’s peer group member. Guess other difference is calculated by the prediction elicited
minus the actual contributions by the subject’s opponent group total contributions.
in many other studies (Sheremeta, 2011; Mago et al., 2016). Intuitively, contributing
zero is a safe choice as it guarantees a secure payoff of 300 (endowment) points.
On the other hand, a strictly positive contribution is a risky choice since it involves
uncertainty on the outcome of the competition.
2.3.4 Belief adjusted deviation
As it often occurs in the experimental literature on contests, we find that subjects’
behaviour deviates from the Nash predictions. Broadly speaking, behavioural de-
viations could be a result of two grounds: strategic uncertainty, e.g. subjects fail
to correctly predict other people’s actions, and personal characteristics, e.g. latter
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social preference and cognitive limitation.23 The research challenge is to identify the
significance of latter in the presence of the former. In order to do this, we introduce
the use of the Belief Adjusted Deviation (BAD) constructed as follows. We collect
players’ beliefs about others’ strategies to derive the contribution that, according to
the theory, maximises their expected payoff.24 Then, we define the difference between
the observed contribution and the belief-adjusted optimal contribution as BAD.
BAD = actual contribution - belief-adjusted optimum,
which represents the behavioural deviations free from strategic concerns.25
By investigating the determinants of BAD we can identify the significance of the
personal characteristics. We focus on the significance of four potential factors: com-
petitiveness, risk attitude, cognitive ability and gender. Competitiveness is measured
by a score based on four personality questions from Duffy and Kornienko (2010).26
Risk preference collected through Holt and Laury (2002). Cognitive abilities are
measured by an incentivised Raven matrix.
Figure 2.2 shows how subjects’ beliefs are distributed. It is evident that subjects
on average hold unbiased predictions about their peer’s and opponent’s contribution
choices. The distribution of the difference peaks around zero27 and it is symmet-
ric around the mean. However, the distributions are quite dispersed, suggesting
23See Sheremeta (2018) for a list of potential explanations on overbidding.
24The belief-adjusted optimal contribution can be derived by replacing the player’s beliefs about
others in Equation (2.2).
25We treat BAD as a directional difference instead of an absolute difference because its distribu-
tion consists of both errors and preferences.
26The competition score ranges from -10 to 10, with higher values suggesting competition seeking.
We provide two for-competition questions and two against-competition questions, and subjects could
choose on a scale of 1 to 6 from strongly disagree to strongly agree. For for-competition questions,
we generate a score from 0 to 5, and -5 to 0 for against-competition questions. The competitive
score is the summed score of four questions.
27The mean is 0.70 and 1.1 for peer and opponent respectively.
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heterogeneity in the prediction capability in a strategically uncertain environment.
On the other hand, Figure 2.3 shows that BAD is asymmetrically distributed. In
all treatments, the distributions of BAD are similar and negatively skewed with a
positive mean. It should also be noted that there are peaks around zero across all
treatments, suggesting that some subjects indeed maximise their expected payoff
according to their beliefs. The significant positive value of the BAD, together with
unbiased predictions, indicates that the systematic overbidding in our experiment is
mainly driven by personal characteristics rather than strategic concerns.
To further specify the determinants of BAD, we conduct multilevel mixed effects
regressions, which are presented in Table 2.5. We find that, BAD in Treatment Prize
cannot be explained by our model. On the other hand, it can be explained by our
model and it shows very similar patterns in Treatment Ability and Treatment Com-
bination. First, the variable period has a negative impact on BAD, thus indicating
that subjects learn to bid optimally over repetition. Second, risk preference has an
economically and statistically positive impact on BAD. Finally, we do not find a
correlation between competitive personality or cognitive score and BAD.28
Result 2.5. The BAD in our experiment is positive and diminishes over time. It
is positively correlated with the risk-seeking. On the other hand, competitiveness and
cognitive skills do not have significant impact on BAD.
2.4 Conclusions
Organisations often use contests to increase the competition within the workplace
and then boost workers’ productivity. For instance, team managers, whose compen-
28BAD is type specific. Compared to the M type, L type subjects show significantly less BAD.
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Figure 2.3: The distribution of BAD
Note: For a more detailed distribution of BAD across treatments and types, see the Appendix C
sation is usually aligned with the results of their group, often face the non-trivial
task of dividing the prize among heterogeneous members. This task is particularly
challenging when it is impossible to observe individual level contributions. Thus,
for such competitive environments, we provide a mechanism of prize division that
does not require observing individuals’ contributions and that maximises a group’s
effectiveness. Our main findings are the following: in easy contests it is optimal to
allocate the entire prize to the most able group members, while in hard contests the
allocation of the prizes depends on the distribution of abilities of all players and their
related marginal productivity. For example, even if the contest is extremely hard, it
may still be efficient to allocate the entire prize to the most able group member.
We then test the theoretical results in the lab, focusing on the effect of intra-group
inequality in contests. Throughout our treatments, we provide a direct comparison
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Dependent Variable: BAD
Treatment Ability Treatment Prize Treatment Combination
Period -0.217*** -0.0414* -0.188***
(0.0255) (0.0219) 0.0255
L-Type -7.815*** -4.148 -8.488***
(2.984) (2.686) (2.955)
H-Type 3.103 1.959 3.362
(3.126) (2.573) (2.779)
Competitive Score 0.074 0.249 0.00652
(0.311) (0.307) (0.280)
Risk-seeeking 1.526** 0.638 1.645**
(0.69) (0.753) (0.682)
IQ score 0.327 -0.339 0.0195
(0.795) (0.771) (0.745)
Female -0.353 -0.191 -0.572
(2.715) (2.203) (2.372)
Constant 10.17 14.71 8.625
(8.768) (8.464) (8.732)
Observations 1560 1800 1320
Table 2.5: BAD multi-level mixed effects regression
Note: Multilevel mixed effects models using random intercepts for experimental sessions and indi-
vidual subjects. L-Type and H-Type are categorical variables standing for the low ability/reward
subjects and high ability/reward subjects respectively. The omitted category is the medium type.
Female is a dummy variable with female subjects being 1. Risk seeking ranges from 1 to 10 with
higher values indicating more risk-seeking attitudes. IQ score is the total No. of correct answers
from 12 questions. Numbers in parentheses indicate standard errors. Significance levels * p < 0.1,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
of the efforts exerted by equal and unequal groups. In contrast to the theory, our
experimental result shows that inequality in ability and inequality in rewards do
not increase group efficiency. Both of them must be used together to substantially
increase a group’s probability of winning.
We extend our analysis to understand how players choose their contributions. We
find that subjects positively respond to their belief about opponents’ contribution,
but they there is not a significant relationship between an individual contributions
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and her belief about the teammate’s decisions.
To conclude we investigate the possible factors behind a player’s deviations from
the model’s prediction. We do this by separating strategic concerns and personal
characteristics through a novel definition of BAD. As a result, we show that players
on average hold unbiased beliefs, but their contributions are significantly higher
than the theoretical predictions adjusted for their beliefs. Further, the BAD in our
experiment is significantly correlated with risk attitudes, with risk-seeking subjects
having a greater BAD. Finally, BAD diminishes over time. The overall analysis
on BAD suggests that error, along with risk-attitudes, may explain overbidding in
contest experiments.
Importantly, in our experiment we implemented a mild level of inequality in re-
wards and found a positive effect on group competitiveness. An interesting question
is to construct an empirical calibration of the relationship between the level of in-
equality and the effectiveness. Although the model predicts a monotonic positive
relationship, behavioural factors such as social comparison concerns may make ex-
treme levels of within group inequality harmful for competitiveness. We leave it for
future research.
Appendix A
Lemma 2.2. Let φoi (φoik, ..., φoini) be the prize allocation that maximises group i’s
probability of winning at the aggregate effort X. If φoi is the solution of φi ∈ argmax σi =
si(X,φi), then it is also the solution of φi ∈ argmax Xi. Formally,
φi ∈ argmax σi ⇔ φi ∈ argmax Xi
Proof. Note that σi = Xi/X. Hence, at a fixed X, it clearly holds that φi ∈
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argmax σi ⇔ φi ∈ argmax Xi.
Proof of Proposition 2.2.1
A Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies is a profile of prize allocations
(φ∗i , ..., φ∗N) and aggregate effortX∗ that simultaneously solve the following equations:








si(X,φi) = 1; (2.7)










In Lemma 2.1 we proved that for any profile of prize allocations (φ1, ..., φN) there
exists a unique equilibrium aggregate 0 < X∗ < ∞ such that ∑Ni σ∗i = 1 and
0 < σ∗i < 1 ∀i, where σ∗i = si(X∗, φi). Hence, it must hold that at an equilibrium
profile of prize allocations (φ∗1, ..., φ∗N) the aggregate X∗ is unique, i.e. we proved
existence. On the other hand, we have to prove that there is only one 0 < X∗ <∞
that simultaneously solves for Equation (2.6-2.7).
Now, note that for any 0 < X < ∞, the left-hand side of (2.8) exceeds the right at
σi = 1, while the right-hand side exceeds the left at σi = 1 and it is decreasing on σi.
It implies that there is a unique 0 < σi < 1 that solves (2.8) for any 0 < X <∞ and
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prize allocation φi = (φi1, ..., φini). Thus, for a fixed aggregate 0 < X <∞, the group
i can achieve any probability of winning σi ∈ [σLi , σHi ] by choosing the appropriate
φi = (φi1, ..., φini). Clearly, there may be more than one φi that achieves the same
σi ∈ [σLi , σHi ]. In order to find σHi , which is the highest probability of winning that
group i can reach at a given aggregate 0 < X <∞, we could either take the implicit
























where φoik is the solution of (2.9). In other words, we maximise the right-hand side
of (2.8) under the condition that σHi = si(X,φoi ).
Easy contests
In easy contests, the right-hand side of Equation (2.8) is a sum of strictly convex
functions, i.e. it is strictly convex. Thus, for any 0 < σHi < 1, the solution of
(2.9) is a corner solution. It implies that there are nhi equilibrium allocation that
maximises the group i’s probability of winning, where nhi is the number of players
with the highest ability in group i. Thus, we are left with proving that there is a
unique 0 < X∗ < ∞ that solves for ∑Ni σHi = 1, i.e. ∑Ni si(X∗, φoi ) = 1. However,
this follows immediately from Lemma 2.1.
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Hard contests
In hard contests, the right-hand side of Equation (2.8) is a sum of strictly concave
functions, i.e. it is strictly concave. Hence, the solution of (2.9) is interior for any





− λ = 0 ∀k. (2.11)






∀k > 1. (2.12)
Now, recall that the left-hand side of (2.10) exceeds the right-hand side at σHi = 1,
while the right-hand side exceeds the left at zero. Furthermore, (2.10) is decreasing













Thus, there is only one pair of 0 < σHi < 1 and φoi that simultaneously solves
for (2.9-2.10) for any 0 < X < ∞. Finally, we are left with proving that there
is a unique 0 < X∗ < ∞ that solve for ∑Ni σHi = 1, i.e. ∑Ni si(X∗, φoi ) = 1.
However, because σi = si(X,φoi ) is strictly decreasing and continuous in X for all
i, limX→∞si(X,φoi ) = 0, and limX→0si(X,φoi ) = 1, then by the intermediate value
theorem there is a unique value of X∗ such that ∑Ni si(X∗, φoi ) = 1. Clearly, at this
X∗ the equilibrium allocation φoi = φ∗i = (φ∗i1, ..., φ∗ini) ∀i.
part ii)
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Note that Equation (2.12) always holds with strict equality if two members have the
same ability. However, as shown in part (iii) (see below) it is still possible that two
or more players with different abilities do not receive a positive share of the prize.
part iii)
Suppose g′′(xik) > 0 at φik = 0. This can occur for two reasons: the public part of











) ∀m > 1. (2.13)
Appendix B
The following instructions are for Treatment Ability and have been read out loud by
the experimenter.
Experimental instructions
You are about to participate in an experiment in the economics of decision-making.
These instructions are meant to clarify how the experiment actually works and how
you earn money in the experiment. Your earnings will be paid to you privately
in cash at the end of the experiment. To ensure the best results for yourself,
and accurate data for the experimenters, please do not communicate with the
other participants at any point during the experiment. If you have any questions,
or need assistance of any kind, raise your hand and an experimenter will come to
you. Economics experiments have a strict policy against deception. If we do anything
deceptive, or don’t pay you in cash as described, then you can complain to the school
of Economics at the University of Edinburgh and we will be in serious trouble. The
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currency in this experiment is expressed in points. Your points will be converted to
cash and paid to you at the end of the experiment privately, based on the exchange
rate.
The currency in this experiment are expressed in points. Your points will be con-
verted to cash and paid to you at the end of the experiment privately, based on the
exchange rate.
1500 points = $4.
In addition you will be paid $3 for participation and a bonus ($2 + a lottery) for
completing all survey questions at the end of this experiment.
The experiment
This experiment involves a decision-making task in groups. The same task will be
played a total of 30 times (rounds). You will not know who your group members are
neither during nor after the experiment. You will be randomly rematched into a new
group after each round. At the beginning of the experiment, you will be randomly
assigned to one of the three types - X, Y or Z. Types will remain fixed until the end
of the entire experiment.
Groups and matching
First, before each round, all participants will be randomly divided into groups of two
assigned in the following way:
XX groups and YZ groups.
If your type is X, then you will always be in a group with another X type player.
If your type is Y, then you will always be in a group with a Z type player.
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If your type is Z, then you will always be in a group with a Y type player.
Second, your group will randomly match with a group of the other type. Hence,
if you are in a XX group, then you are always matched with a YZ group and vice
versa. Finally, after each round all groups are dissolved, all participants will be
randomly assigned (again) into groups according to their types, and then the groups
will randomly re-match.
The task
For every round, your group is competing against your matched group for a reward
worth 1000 points. If your group wins, the reward will be divided equally between
the two of you.
All participants begin each round with an endowment of 300 points and choose a con-
tribution to the group account. The minimum No. of contributions is 0 and the maxi-
mum is 50, and any integer between 0 and 50 is also allowed. The group account is the
sum of the contributions of its members. Contributions have a cost based on the par-
ticipants’ type and details are listed on Table 1 (a separate piece of paper on your desk).
You are allowed to contribute with costs higher than your endowment, by paying
more points than your endowment. Doing so may result in a negative payoff for that
specific round, however, at the end of the experiment, we will make sure you earn at
least the show-up fee.
The chance that your group receives the reward in a round depends on the contri-
butions on your group account and your matched group’s account. At the start of
each round, all 4 participants (you, your group member, and the two participants
in the other group) will decide how much to contribute simultaneously. Once the
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contribution decisions are made, a computerized lottery will determine which group
will receive the reward.
In this lottery draw there are 2 types of tickets: type XX and type YZ. Each type
of ticket corresponds to the group who will receive the reward if a ticket of this type
is drawn. Thus, if a type XX ticket is drawn, then group XX wins. If a type YZ
ticket is drawn, then group YZ wins. The reward will be equally shared between the
winning group members.
The number of tickets of each type corresponds exactly to the contributions on the
group account.
No. of XX tickets = No. of contributions by member X + No. of contributions
by member X.No. of YZ tickets = No. of contributions by member Y + No. of
contributions by member Z.
Every ticket is equally likely to be drawn by the computer.
In addition to the above task, while you are deciding your contribution, you will
be asked to predict (1) the total contribution on your group’s and (2) on the other
group’s account. For every correct prediction, you will receive 50 points (0 for incor-
rect predictions).
An example
Suppose the contributions on group XX’s account are 32 (13 + 19), and the contri-
bution on group YZ’s account is 15 (5 for Y + 10 for Z). There will be a total of 47
(32+15) tickets and each ticket is equally likely to be the winning one. The feedback
will be shown to you as following:
In this example, the winning group, XX players have a payoff calculated as:
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group Contributions Tickets Chance of winning Winner ticket Winning group
XX 32 1-32 0.68 8 XX
ZY 15 33-47 0.32 8 XX
Payoff = reward/2 + endowment – individual cost of contribution + prediction profit.
Then, in points is Payoff = 1000/2 + 300 – individual cost of contribution + 50*No.
of correct prediction.
On the other hand, the other group, YZ players have a payoff calculated as:
Payoff = endowment – individual cost of contribution+ prediction profit.
Note that each player has her own contribution decision and the corresponding costs
(listed in Table 1). Numbers in the example are for illustrative purpose and in no
way they suggest what you should do in the actual experiment.
At the end of the experiment, 5 rounds will be randomly selected for actual payments
and you will earn the sum profit of these 5 rounds. Thus it is in your best interest
to make serious decisions for every round.
Feedback
At the end of each round, you will receive feedback information on your group’s
contributions, the other group’s contributions, the winning group and your profit in
this round.
Practice questions
Before the start of today’s session, please answer the practice questions shown on




After the practice questions, you will experience a trial round which will not be
selected for payment. After the trial round, you will be given additional opportunities
to ask questions. After which, the 30 rounds eligible for payments begin.
The survey
After the end of round 30, you will be asked to participate in a survey. Instructions
for completing the survey will be shown on your screen. At the end the survey, a
bonus reward will be provided.
The end of the experiment
Please remain seated and follow the instructions by leaving the room one by one to
receive your payment. Thank you very much.
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The cost table (for Treatment Ability)
This table specifies the cost of contribution for different types. For example, if you
are type X, by choosing to contribute 7 tickets, it costs you 52 points.
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Figure 2.10: Teams’ contributions over time
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War of Attrition with Outside
Options
3.1 Introduction
Models of auctions have increasingly attracted attention for their empirical and the-
oretical importance. Today, a colossal amount of resources is allocated through
auctions. Goods and services are sold in online auction platforms and procurement
offers, as well as firms’ privatisation, are made through auctions. Furthermore, all-
pay auctions, together with contests in the style of Tullock (1967), are established
tools for modelling situations in which every bid pays regardless of the outcome.
Examples for this type of auctions include students competing for grades on a curve,
workers competing for jobs, firms contending the monopoly of a market, and coun-
tries fighting over a territory.
In many of the situations above, bidders have possibly diverse valuations of the
prize, but also diverse outside options. For instance, buyers have differing willingness
to pay because they privately know of an alternative item they can buy to substitute
the one auctioned. Another example includes the non-refundable investments made
by two firms competing in a R&D race. The volume of the investments depends on
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the profits the firms would make winning the patent, but also on the profits they
would make if the patent is won by someone else.
In this paper, we focus on the war of attrition (second price all-pay auctions)
with outside options and incomplete information. We propose a model with the
following features. Players receive a pair of signals: their valuation of the prize, and
their valuation of the outside option. Signals within the same pair can be correlated
whereas signals between pairs are independent. In other words, if a player has a high
valuation of the prize when signals are (positively) correlated, then she probably
has a high valuation for the outside option. Nonetheless, this does not imply that
another player has a greater probability of having higher signals as well.
Using this framework, we show that our model can be reduced to a standard war
of attrition in one signal. The value of the “new” signal equals the difference between
the pair of valuations received by a player, and its distribution can be derived using
the distributions of the valuations the prize and of the outside option. We then
describe the symmetric equilibrium bidding strategy and the expected payments of
the game.
In the model, we allow for the possibility that a player may prefer the outside
option over the prize. As a result, it may occur that only a subset of the players
takes part in the competition. We call this set of players “participants”.
Under the assumption that the participants know the exact number of competi-
tors they face before choosing their bid, we show that the expected aggregate of the
payments of the auction is the weighted average of the expected aggregate payments
for any number of participants. The weights are given by a binomial distribution,
where the probability of success corresponds to the probability that a player’s valu-
ation of the prize is higher than her valuation of the outside option.
We also discuss the case in which all players take part in the auction, even those
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with a higher valuation of the outside option. Despite these players bidding zero,
their participation in the contest substantially changes the strategy of the players in-
terested in winning the prize. To see why this occurs let us focus on the information
available to a player with a higher valuation of the prize. Contrary to the previous
case, she does not know how many players will bid a strictly positive amount. What
she knows instead is the probability that a random player makes a positive bid, as
it is equal to the probability that a player’s valuation of the prize is higher than the
valuation of the outside option. Using this information, a player derives the proba-
bility of competing against every number of strictly positive bids. The probability
mass function of every event can be calculated using the binomial distribution since
pairs of signals are independent draws. Finally, players have to choose one bidding
strategy for all possible events. We show that the equilibrium strategy is a weighted
average of the strategies they would adopt knowing the number of strictly positive
bids.
We conclude by undertaking comparative static for a specific case of distribution
functions. Our analysis shows that a more spread out distribution of the valuations
increases the expected aggregate of the payments.
Literature Review
The first game theoretic approach to auctions can be found in Vickrey (1961), who
also made a considerable contribution on the well-known revenue equivalence theo-
rem. As discussed in Myerson (1981), when the bidders are risk-neutral and values
are independently and identically distributed, the “revenue equivalence principle”
states that many types of auction formats have the same expected revenue for the
seller. On the other hand, if the players’ valuations are affiliated, then the war of at-
trition raises higher expected revenue than the other auction structures (see Milgrom
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and Weber (1982) and Krishna and Morgan (1997)).
Other work on optimal auctions are by Jehiel et al. (1996, 1999). In situations
where the sale in an auction affects the future interactions between potential buyers,
the authors use a mechanism design approach to construct the revenue-maximizing
auction for the seller. Their model assumes that agents who do not acquire the object
are characterised by an identity-dependent externality. In a complete information
model with identity-dependent externalities, Klose and Kovenock (2015) derive a
necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of equilibria in the all-pay auc-
tion. Contrary to our model, the outside options in these papers are endogenously
determined either by the mechanism itself or by others’ strategies.
McAfee and McMillan (1987) and Matthews (1987) study first-price auctions
with a stochastic number of risk-averse bidders. While they do not characterise
the equilibrium strategies, they study whether it is better to reveal or conceal the
information about the number of bidders. In a setting with independent private
signals, Harstad et al. (1990) show that equilibrium strategies in first and second
price auctions with a stochastic number of bidders are weighted averages of the
equilibrium strategies when the number of bidders is common knowledge. Recently,
Bos (2012), shows that the same result holds in a model of war of attrition.
A framework complementary to ours is examined in Green and Laffont (1984),
where the authors study auctions with reservation utilities. In their model, players
decide whether to take part in the competition by comparing the expected utility of
doing so to their own reservation utility. If a player takes part in an auction, then
she gives up her reservation utility. In our model, on the other hand, only the winner
has to renounce to her outside option.
A model of war of attrition with outside option can be found in Hafer (2006). In
the first part of the paper, the author studies conflicts with incomplete information in
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which players receive two signals and proves the equilibrium existence. Although this
similarity, the way players’ payoff are defined substantially differs from our model.
Further, the author assumes that the two signals are independent, identically and
uniformly distributed.
To the best of our knowledge, the closest paper to ours is Kirchkamp et al. (2009).
The authors extend the first price and second price auction with independent private
values to allow for public and private outside options. They derive the symmetric
equilibrium strategies of the game and test the prediction in the laboratory. There
are three main differences between their theoretical model and ours. First, we study
war of attrition models while they focus on first and second price auction. Second,
they assume that all players strictly prefer to compete as they always value the prize
more than the outside option. Finally, we undertake comparative statics on the
distribution of the signals.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 3.2 surveys the main results of the
standard war of attrition; Section 3.3 presents the model with outside option and
related applications; Section 3.4 concludes.
3.2 The standard war of attrition
Readers who are familiar with the model of war of attrition (or second-price all-pay
auction) can skip this section.
There are n risk-neutral players that compete for a prize. Prior to the contest each
agent i receives a private signal, vi, that affects her valuation of the prize. Individuals
are symmetric, and each of them knows their own valuation and perceives the other
n − 1 valuations to be random draws from the distribution F (v) on [v, v], where
v ≥ 0. Altogether, the payoff of individual i is
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πi =
vi − bi, if bi > maxj 6=ibj−bi, if bi < maxj 6=ibj
Let Pr(bi) be the probability that bi > maxj 6=ibj, i.e. that i is the player with the
highest bid, and let p(bi) be the probability that bi = maxj 6=ibj, then the player i’s
expected payoff is
Πi(bi) = (1− Pr(bi))(−bi) +
ˆ bi
0
p(t)(vi − t)dt. (3.1)
Player i has to choose the highest bid bi she is willing to commit in order to attempt
to win the prize and then have a payoff of (vi− bi). Suppose that agent j 6= i follows
the strategy β(vj), where β is differentiable and increasing. Since β is increasing,
then Pr(bi > maxj 6=ibj) = F n−1(vi) and bidder i’s expected payoff in (3.1) can be
rewritten as
Πi(bi) = (1− F n−1(β−1(bi))(−bi) +
ˆ β−1(bi)
v
(t− β(t))dF n−1(t). (3.2)



















dt = vih(vi), (3.3)






The derivation of β is only heuristic as its optimality when all j 6= i adopt β(vj) has
not been established. The next lemma provides sufficient conditions for β to be a
symmetric equilibrium.
Lemma 3.1. Suppose that, for all v, vh(v) is an increasing function. The equilib-





Proof. Suppose that all j 6= i follow the strategy β(vj), while i plays as if her signal
was wi, then the optimal wi has to satisfy
Π(wi) = (1− F n−1(wi))(−β(wi)) +
ˆ wi
v
(vi − β(t))dF n−1(t).
The first-order condition with respect to wi is
β′(wi) = vih(wi)
By substituting β′(wi) with Equation (3.3) we have wi = ki.
The following lemma describes the expected payments of the game.
Lemma 3.2. In the standard war of attrition, the expected payment for a player who

















Proof. The expected payment of player i with signal vi is















Substituting β′(t) with (3.3) completes the proof.
In the next section, we introduce a war of attrition where players have two private
signals: the valuation of the prize and the valuation of the outside outside option.
As we will see, this game can be reduced to the standard war of attrition.
3.3 The war of attrition with outside options
Typically, bidders who compete in auctions do not only have different valuations for
the prize, but also different outside options. Consider, for example, two companies
investing to get the the monopoly of a market.1 Their decision on how much to invest
must depend on the profit they can make, but also on the profit they would make in
a different market. Alternatively, one can interpret the outside option as the profit
a company would make if a competitor becomes the monopolist. Finally, it can also
represent an individual’s payoff at the time in which the contest takes place. On the
other hand, the valuation of the prize, represents the payoff level a player reaches by
winning the competition.
As we will see below, the model is general enough to include cases in which players
have negative outside options (negative starting payoffs) and negative prize valua-
1A recent case on this is the competition for cloud services between Amazon, Google and Mi-
crosoft, see https://www.economist.com/business/2014/08/30/silver-lining.
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tion, but they still participate in the auction as winning would improve their status.
Clearly, in all the examples above, winning the auction automatically excludes the
use of the outside option, however, losing does not imply players have to renounce
it.
3.3.1 Preliminaries
There are n risk-neutral players who compete for a prize. Prior to the contest player
i receives two private signals: vi represents her valuation for the prize, while oi her
valuation for the outside option. Players are symmetric, each of them knows her own
type (vi, oi) and perceives that the valuations of others are random draws from the
distributions F (v) on [v, v] and G(o) on [o, o], respectively. Note that F (v) and G(o)
do not need to be cdf of the same family, do not need to be independent, and there
are no assumptions on their support. Further, we assume that winning the contest
automatically cancels out the winner’s outside option. In other words, among all
players it is only the winner who enjoys the prize and renounces her outside option.
Altogether, the payoff of individual i is
πi =
vi −maxj 6=ibj, if bi > maxj 6=ibjoi − bi, if bi < maxj 6=ibj
Player i chooses the bid bi that maximises her payoff. Let Pr(bi) be the probability
that bi > maxj 6=ibj, i.e. player i is the the player with the highest bid, and let p(bi)
be the expected probability that bi = maxj 6=ibj, then player i expected payoff is
Πi(bi) = (1− Pr(bi))(oi − bi) +
ˆ bi
0
p(t)(vi − t)dt. (3.7)




(vi − oi) = 1.
Note that a symmetric strategy as a function of the two signals cannot be solved
because of the infinite (vi, oi) that relates to a given bi. However, it is easy to see
that players with the same zi = vi − oi ≥ 0 must choose the same bi. Thus, an
equivalent problem to the maximization of (3.7) is the maximization of
Πi(bi) = (1− Pr(bi))(−bi) +
ˆ bi
0
p(t)(zi − t)dt. (3.8)
An alternative way to show the two problems are equivalent is the following:











= (1− Pr(bi))(−bi) +
ˆ bi
0
p(t)(vi − oi − t)dt.
The game with two signals has been reduced to a game with one signal, z = v − o,
which equals the difference between the prize valuation and the outside option. The
new signal z is distributed accordingly to F̃ (z) with support [z, z] = [v − o, v − o].
The explicit distribution of F̃ (z) can be derived using the fact that v and o are
distributed accordingly to F (v) and G(o), respectively.
Before moving to the equilibrium analysis of the game, we need to define the
behaviour of the players with z < 0 as we didn’t put any restriction on the support
of the distribution functions. There are two cases to be considered. First, these
players do not take part in the contest as they already know they strictly prefer the
outside option. This, for example, occurs when players know their valuation of the
prize before the auction takes place. Second, they take part in the contest and bid
zero. This situation accounts for the cases in which players receive their valuation
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for the prize only if they participate in the competition. While for the former case
we characterise the equilibrium strategies and expected payments, for the latter we
limit our analysis to the existence of symmetric strategies.
3.3.2 Case 1
Assume that n players receive their signals, but those with z < 0 do not take part in
the competition. It is public knowledge the number of k ≤ n players will participate
in the contest and bid. We use the word “participant” when we refer to any one of
these k players. As for the standard war of attrition, suppose that participant j 6= i
follows the strategy β(zj), where β is differentiable and increasing in zj = vj−oj ≥ 0.
Since β is increasing, then participant i’s probability of having the highest bid equals
the probability of having the highest signal among the k participants (who have a
signal z > 0). Formally, Pr(bi > maxj 6=ibj) = Pr(zi > maxj 6=izj) = F̈ k−1(zi), where
F̈ (zi) = F̃ (zi)−F̃ (0)1−F̃ (0) . The participant i’s expected payoff is
Πi(bi) = (1− F̈ k−1(β−1(bi))(−bi) +
ˆ β−1(bi)
0
(t− β(t))dF̈ k−1(t). (3.9)
It is easy to see that the solution of the maximization problem of (3.9) is equivalent
to solution of the standard war of attrition2 with the caveat that the new cdf is
F̈ k−1(zi), i.e. the truncated cdf, from 0 to z, of F̃ (z).
Proposition 3.3.1. Let ḧ(z) be the hazard rate of F̈ k−1(zi). Suppose that, for all
z ∈ [0, z], zḧ(z) is an increasing function. For any k = (2, .., n), the equilibrium












Proof. The proof follows directly from Lemma (3.1).
It is also possible to recover participant i’s strategy in terms of her signals v and o,
using the related distributions. Nonetheless, to state the following results there is no
need of specifying strategies as a function of the signals v and o.
Proposition 3.3.2. The equilibrium strategy βO(z) is increasing in v and decreasing
in o. Furthermore, limz→0 βO(z) = 0 limz→z βO(z) =∞.
Proof. As the equilibrium strategy is increasing in z = v − o, then, all things being
equal, it is increasing in v and decreasing in o.3 The rest of the proof follows from
the two limits: limz→0
´ z
0 tḧ(t)dt = 0 and limz→z
´ z
0 tḧ(t)tdt = ∞. The same result
holds for z > 0 by proposition 1 in Krishna and Morgan (1997).
In addition, we can also describe the participants’ expected contributions and the
related expected aggregate of payments.

















Proof. The proof follows directly from Lemma (3.2).
Importantly, if the lower bound of the support of F̃ (z) is greater than or equal to
zero, then all n players participate in the auction. The probability of having the
3Strictly increasing if z > 0.
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highest signal reduces to F̈ k−1(z) = F̃ n−1(z), as it is unnecessary to truncate F̃ (z).
In this case, the expected aggregate of the payments is B̂O(k = n). On the other
hand, when the lower bound of the support of F̃ (z) is lower than zero, players may
receive a negative signal and do not participate in the contest. So, the expected
aggregate of an auction with n players is the probability-weighted average of the
expected aggregate B̂O(k) for k = (0, 1, ..., n).
As already discussed above, the signals are independent random draws, and a
player’s probability of having a signal z ≥ 0 is 1 − F̃ (0). So, the probability of
having a contest with k participants (out of the total number of players n) is the
probability of getting exactly k successes in n independent Bernoulli trials, where
the probability of success is 1− F̃ (0) and the probability of failure is F̃ (0).
Proposition 3.3.4. Let k = (0, 1, ..., n) be the number of participants out of a total





(1 − F̃ (0))kF̃ (0)n−k the related probability that event k





Furthermore, the probability that the aggregate payment is zero is
p0 + p1. (3.14)
3.3.3 Case 2
Suppose that all n players take part in the auction, and those with z ≤ 0 bid zero.
Contrary to the previous section, players do not know how many k ≤ n will bid, as
there is uncertainty over the number of players interested in winning the prize. In
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order words, the k participants with signal z > 0 do not know how many (strictly
positive) bids they have to beat.
A player i, with z > 0, faces a stochastic number of competitors as the probability
that a random player j 6= i bids a positive amount is 1− F̃ (0). Thus, the probability





(1− F̃ (0))kF̃ (0)n−k.
Assume as before that agent j 6= i follows the strategy β(z), where β is differ-












(t− β(t))dF̈ k−1(t). (3.15)
The equilibrium existence follows from the following proposition.
Proposition 3.3.5. Bos (2012). For a player with z > 0, the equilibrium strategy
in the war of attrition with a stochastic number of bidders is a weighted average
of equilibrium strategies where the number of bidders is common knowledge. For a
player with z ≤ 0, the equilibrium strategy is to bid zero.
The characterisation of the bidding strategies of the standard auctions with stochas-
tic competition directly applies to our model with two signals, as the symmetric
equilibrium strategy of this game is a weighted average of βO(z) defined in (3.10).
However, given that it is extremely difficult to specify the weights of the equilibrium
strategies, see Example 3 in Bos (2012), we are not able to describe the expected
aggregate of the payments.
Applications
A natural question to ask, using the model presented in Case 1, is whether an
increase in dispersion of the signals, in the sense of a mean preserving spread of
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the distribution, affects the aggregate of the payments. While until now we did not
specify the distribution of z, to undertake this exercise we restrict our attention to
some specific cases.
Recall that we define F̃ (z) and f̃(z) as the cdf and pdf of signal z = v− o, where
v and o are distributed according to f(v) on [v, v] and g(o) on [o, o], respectively.
Clearly, any change of f̃(z) is due to a change in f(v), g(o) or both.4
Now, let f̃ ′(z) be the mean preserving spread of f̃(z). We ask whether the
expected aggregate of the payments, defined by (3.13), is higher when valuations
are distributed according to f̃ ′(z) or f̃(z). In other words, we are interested in the
change of the expected aggregate of the payments when there is an increase in the
uncertainty of the signal z.
In what follows, we consider the mean preserving spread of density functions
symmetrically distributed around zero. This assumption substantially facilitates our
analysis as the probability that a player bid zero is not affected by a higher dispersion
of the valuations, see figures (3.1) and (3.2).
(a) PDFs (b) CDFs
Figure 3.1: Mean-preserving spread of Normal distribution
4For example, if v ∼ N (µv, σ2v) and o ∼ N (µo, σ2o), then z ∼ N (µv − µo, σ2v + σ2o). Hence, an
increase in either σ2v or σ2o affect the distribution of z, which becomes more disperse.
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Proposition 3.3.6. Suppose that the probability density function of the signals f̃(z)
is continuous and symmetrically distributed around its mean of zero. Let f̃ ′(z) be a
mean preserving spread of f̃(z) and F (0) = F ′(0), then the expected aggregate of the
payments B̂′O(n) > B̂O(n).
Proof. As F̃ (0) = F̃ ′(0), we can focus on the the expected value of B̂O(k) and





respectively. Further, because f̃ ′(z) is the mean preserving spread of f̃(z), then F̃ ′(z)
first order stochastic dominates F̃ (z) in z ∈ (0, z). This implies that the expected
value of the second order statics of F̃ ′(z) is greater then the one of F̃ (z) for all k.
(a) PDFs (b) CDFs
Figure 3.2: Mean-preserving spread of a Triangular Distribution
In other words, a mean preserving spread around zero does not affect the probability
that a player bids zero, but it increases the probability the participants receive a
higher signal of z. Overall, the expected aggregates of the payments increases. Figure
(3.3) shows the expected aggregates as a function of n players of the mean preserving
spread occurred in figures (3.1) and (3.2).
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(a) Normal Distributions (b) Triangular and Uniform distribution
Figure 3.3: Expected aggregate of the payments as a function of n
3.4 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate a new type of war of attrition in which players receive
two signals: the valuation of the prize and the valuation of the outside option. We
show that, if players’ valuation of the prize is always greater than the valuation of the
outside option, our model can be reduced to a standard model of war of attrition. If
we allow for the possibility that a player may prefer the outside option over the prize,
then there are two cases to be considered. First, only a subset of players compete,
those with a preference for the prize. We call “participants” this set of players.
Second, all players participate in the auction, and those with a preference for the
outside option bid zero. As we show, this subtle difference creates a considerable
divergence in players’ equilibrium strategies.
In the first scenario, the number of bidders is public knowledge. So, participants
know the exact number of bids they have to beat. We describe the equilibrium
strategy and show that the expected aggregate of the payments of the auction is
the weighted average of the expected aggregate of the payments for any number of
participants. The number of participants follows a binomial distribution, where the
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probability of success corresponds to the probability that a player prefers the prize
over the outside option. Assuming that players know the number of bidders they
face, we undertake comparative statics for a specific case of distribution functions.
Our analysis shows that a more spread out distribution of the signals can increase
the expected aggregate of the payments.
The second scenario is equivalent to a game with stochastic participation. A
player interested in winning the prize does not know how many players will bid a
strictly positive amount. On the contrary, what she does know is the probability
that a random player makes a positive bid, as it corresponds to the probability
that a player’s valuation of the prize is higher than the valuation of the outside
option. Using this information, a player derives the probability for every number of
strictly positive bids she could compete against. The probability of every number
of possible participants follows a binomial distribution since draws are independent.
Finally, players choose one bidding strategy for all possible events. Such equilibrium
strategy is a weighted average of the strategies they would adopt knowing the number
of strictly positive bids.
An interesting open question is the comparison of the expected aggregate gener-
ated by the two situations. For example, whether a regulator who wants to minimise
total expenditures should disclose or reveal the number of companies interested to
get the monopoly of a market. We leave it to future research.
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